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The end of the Cold War in the beginning of the1990s has marked the shift in a bipolar 
world order system. Changing geopolitical, economic and social environment, as well as rapid 
technological progress, has led to a deep restructuring and streamlining of the defence entities in 
Europe and the United States. National States had to adapt to changing conditions by redefining 
their Defence and Security policies. Consequently, in over a decade the defence sector has 
undergone a drastic restructuring and consolidation. With European states have redefined their 
defence industrial policies by mainly reducing their military expenditures the national defence 
industries have suffered greatly. Defence companies had to streamline their production into new 
operational dimension of greater capacity requirements and weapons efficiency. Furthermore, 
national defence contractor has to cope with new technological innovations while dealing with 
budget cuts in public procurement policies. 
Moreover, in the course of defence industry transition the relationship between the industry and 
the state has been changing drastically. During the Cold War period, the military sector and 
resources were tightly controlled by the state, so defence industrial sector was largely national.
1
 
With the new world order, the relationship between states and their related defence industries 
gain more entrepreneurial character to a different extent. As national governments began to act 
as “real” customers, defence contractors had to adapt to a new market economy and competition.  
This led to gradual rationalization and institutionalization of defence sector beyond national 
border with a different degree of success.  
 
1.2. CONCEPTUAL EXPLANATION 
This research project seeks to investigate, analyse and compare how new geopolitical 
environment has affected defence industrial policy of the three major European military powers 
– France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Moreover, the analysis of national defence 
industrial policy will be conducted within its military and material dimension. With a 
considerable body of analysis attributing causal primary to economic and industrial aspects of 
the national defence, this study seeks to analyse dynamics of the state-industry relationship. 
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Therefore, the main objective of the research is to analyze national defence industry (being the 
targeted subject in this research) of chosen states and to examine the impact of economic and 
geopolitical pressures on their capacity.  
This study is particularly relevant for the EU’s common defence and security policy for two 
contrasting reasons. The first is the great sensitivity of Member States over their national 
preferences in military matters, as evidenced by their efforts over the years to ensure that every 
aspect of defence policy is kept under national control and separate from EU institutions. The 
second is the growing recognition by Member States of the need to pool and share their military 
capabilities in order to protect national security interest in an international environment where, 
individually, they are losing influence.
2
 However, while there may be a rationale for greater 
defence cooperation if not further integration within EU, the institutional developments and legal 
framework of the cooperation on EU level indicates that nearly every attempt to facilitate 
defence cooperation is vigorously contested.  
The issues of national defence policy dynamics in course of economic and budgetary crisis are 
both of political and academic relevance.  Although, various aspects of the defence cooperation 
and integration within EU have received significant academia attention, the scholarship on the 
defence integration is generally fragmented in its theoretical inquiry. Thus, this research aims to 
explore an analytical utility of two main competing theories in the international relations, 
particularly Constructivism and Neorealism, in regards to the EU defence policy and interactions 
between main actors within. Critical assessment of two theories suggest that Neorealist insights 
on forms of alliance formation behavior and its systematic approach to international relations is  
of greater relevance for the present research’s objectives. Taking into consideration, that national 
governments are at the same time the main customers, regulators and financers of the defence 
industry, they are in a position to directly influence its structure and performance.
3
 With the 
assumption that states play a major role in the process of defence industry consolidation and they 
chose to participate in various integration projects in regards to their strategic objectives and 
interests, either it gaining more power or assuring its national sovereignty, this study lays within 
the Neorealist conceptual framework.  
In this context, the central question of research is: 
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- How did member states of EU respond to geopolitical and economical context of the post-
Cold War era in regard to their national defence industrial policies?  
In respect to the research question a set of supplementary questions has been drawn: How the 
change in the high politics affected the other dimensions of the non-traditional aspect of 
international security, in particular how the relationship among economics-power-security 
reconfigured? How national industrial policies have influence the defence integration and 
institutionalization process within EU?  In what ways EU institutions adopted their reasons of 
existence and co-existence into this new defence architecture? 
Drawing from the realism assumption on the role of state’s interest in power configurations, the 
hypothesis of this study is:  
 Despite geopolitical pressures and economic stagnation, national states of the EU do not 
transition its control over assets that are strategically important to national sovereignty 
towards supranational entities.  
Therefore, the integration of national defence sectors in the EU remains rather limited and 
fragmented. Its trajectory is controlled and enforced by the national states acting in the line with 
their objectives. 
1.3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Examining the restructuring of national defence industry appears to be challenging due to 
the dynamic character of events that shape policy in this area. However, in order to achieve 
stated objectives qualitative with elements of quantitative research methods have been selected. 
The analysis is operated in deductive manner which is characterized by top-down approach. 
Moreover, the research design is comparative and case-oriented. Comparative research analysis 
of selected cases is perfectly suited to examine multi-causality of external as well as internal 
factors on national defence sectors in particular and unique context. As well as it gives the 
opportunity to compare the impact of the implemented austerity and restructuring measures by 
the state on national defence industry capacity and examine certain features of national defence 
spending trends. Thus, independent variable is structural precondition and assembly of national 
defence sector in the Cold War. In turn, the degree of defence industry restructuring, its 
retrenchment and success of implemented efforts to security and military reforms on national and 
EU levels are dependent variables. This research comprises set of intermediate variables shaped 
by national policy directions and national strategic cultures along with dynamics of international 
and institutional cooperation on the EU level. 
4 
 
The thesis is orginised in the following manner. In the beginning, the in-depth description of 
main defence industry characteristics will be provided. The structure of supply and deman side 
will be discussed in a greater detail in order to provide readers with broader understanding of 
defence industry peculiarities. In the next chapter, dynamics of defence cooperation within EU 
framework will be examined. The greater attention will be given to the European institutional 
and legal instruments in shaping defence cooperation of the national states. In the third chapter 
the theoretical framework of this thesis will be provided. It will focus on two main competing 
theories in the international relations - Constructivism and Neorealism. Their theoretical utility, 
strength and limits in regards to defence cooperation process in the EU will be analysed.  
In next chapters the case study of France, Germany and the U.K. will be presented. Case study 
will be implemented in the similar manner:1) analysis of the state positiong in the defence 
industry after the Cold war;  2) economic trends and indicators of the national DTIB; 3) armed 
forces structural reforms and national procurement policy; 4) defence industry: the supply side; 
5) Multilateral cooperation; 6) approach to CSDP; 7) Conclusion. In the conclusion chapter, the 
comparative analysis of national defence industrial policies will be conducted alongside with 
application of the theoretical insights on the European defence integration.  
 
1.4 COUNTRY SELECTION 
Germany, France and the United Kingdom have been selected for the following reasons. 
First, each represents relatively great military power within the EU and their Defence Industrial 
and Technological Base (DTIB) are of great importance in Europe. Secondly, they all represent 
distinctive models of state-industry relationship configuration, which were developed over the 
last decades. During the Cold War, the states had very similar positions and structure of DTIBs, 
where states were largely involved in the organization of the defence sector as the client who 
determined the way military programmes were developed and financed.
4
 However, in aftermath 
of the Cold War, each of these three states have chosen different path in developing state-
industry relationship: the U.K. adopted the liberal model favoring open and competitive market; 
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Germany decided to distance itself from its defence industry; France chose to preserve its 




1.5. LITERATURE OVERVIEW 
The case study analysis  is conducted through archival research based on scholarly 
literature, national security documents, mission and capability analyses, official EU documents 
and statements, and published interviews. Among others, the archival research will focus on 
national security policy documents relating to initiatives conducted in respond to the budgetary 
pressures, reports and investigations by national Ministry of Defence, various domestic agencies 
and parliamentary bodies in each country. It will also involve the examination of similar 
documents and reports produced through the European institutions and agencies. Finally, it will 
include an examination of key policy speeches by responsible ministers and heads of government 
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2. STRUCTURE OF EUROPEAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY 
The defence industry is rather different from rest industries, due to its unique relationship 
within nation state. To many states an appropriate defence technological and industrial base 
(DTIB) is crucial to its political sovereignty. Throughout the last decades states have invested 
heavily into the industry in order to ensure security of supply (SoS) and make themselves as 
much independent as possible from exterior support and supplies. Consequently, national 
defence industry usually exists within the defence industrial triptych where national government 
is the main customer, sponsor and regulator.
6
 Thus, the industry’s configurations, ownership, 
performance and trade are determined by its national government policy. The general 
characteristics of defence industry market are: 
a) An emphasis on the performance of high technology weaponry rather than on cost. 
b) The bearing of risks by governments who often finance R&D and in some cases 
provides investment in capital and infrastructure. 
c) Elaborate rules and regulations on contracts, as a result of the lack of a competitive 
market and to assure public accountability. 
d) Close relations between the contractors, the procurement executive and the military. 
e) Outside of the US many companies will be national monopolies or close to it.
7
 
These characteristics led to the development of a trend within the market where national 
champions have an advantage in obtaining production contracts, as they have special relations 
with the military and the procurement executive. These contractors tend to seek involvement in 
the production of technologically advanced weapon systems with potential over time contract 
prolongation as governments frequently ask for technological improvements and/or 
modifications. Granting large research and design contracts with guaranteed cost coverage 
and/or risk borne by the state typically leads to high profitability despite the low efficiency in 
manufacturing. 
The structure of the market compromises both barriers to entry and barriers to exit for defence 
producers. Those barriers are imposed by government procurement policy that often justifies 
national protectionism behavior on the ground of SoS and wider economic benefits such as jobs, 
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exports, etc. The emphasis on performance and development of large scale projects, that is 
associated with constant rising costs of R&D, makes it significantly difficult for single 
companies to deliver new advanced weapon systems.
8
 Consequently, the pressure in the defence 
industry has led to concentration of the production within fewer and larger companies, which are 
favored by national governments. The recent decrease of available resources for domestic orders 
and on-going national protectionist policy unveiled the inefficiencies of this arms industry 
configuration in following domains: 
- Economics: constantly increasing per-unit costs, loss of economies of scale and 
learning, absence of competition among companies; 
- Defence: lower levels of technological sophistication, poor availability of cutting 
edge capabilities; 
- Technology: slower rates of innovation, growing gap to leading companies outside 
the EU; 
- Industry: loss of production capacities and changing markets;  
- Security: increasing dependency on foreign suppliers. 9 
In order to proceed with the analysis of the defence industry development within the EU, it’s 
important to explore and define the market size, structure and drivers of the defence industry 
sector.  
2.1. THE SUPPLY SIDE 
  Although an arm production is to a larger extend a core manufacturing branch of 
military and defence producers, civil production still represents a great share of their business. 
Companies in the defence sector deliver a broad range of products , as they called in the 
literature “defence products”, “weapon systems”, “military equipment”, “arms” and/or “dual-use 
good” alongside with production of various components of these products. The term “dual-use 
goods” indicates specific feature of arms production process that often borders with other civil 
sectors (such as IT, electronics, civil aviation, etc.). Subsequently, an arms production is 
delivered by a mixture of various military and civilian companies of different size that are 
involved on different stages of the process, starting from various supplementary services to a full 
scale weapon manufacture.  
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Thus, a defence technology and industrial base is the group of companies that supply the military 
with a range of products and services needed for their operation. Precisely, DTIB can be defined 
as the combination of people, institutions, technological know-how, and facilities used to design, 
develop, manufacture and maintain the arms and supporting defence equipment necessary to 
meet nation state’s security objectives.
10
 The structure of DTIB is very heterogeneous and 
hierarchical.
11
 Indeed, very few arms manufacturers are capable of putting together complicated 
weapon systems, incorporating various aspects of defence such as sensors, optics, navigation, 
etc., while being reliable partner to their government costumer. Thus, the top tier companies are 
supported by manufacturers that are lower in the production chain, who provide specific 
components and subsystems. And they, in turn, are supported by their own suppliers and so the 
production chain goes further down. (See Table 1) 
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Basic economic infrastructure 
Source: Bekkers, F. et al. Development of a European Defence Technological and 
Industrial Base. Main report. TNO, 2009 
Prime contractors are lead systems integrators, platform producers and manufacturers of weapon 
systems). Along EU lines these are mainly large companies (primarily national champions), 
specialised on defence and military systems production. Lead system integrators assemble 
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defence systems from several defence domains, such as BAE Systems (UK) and Airbus Group 
(ex EADS – Pan-European). 
Others focus its production in mostly one area: Thales (France), Saab (Sweden) in fighter 
aircraft; Leonardo (ex Finmeccanica -Italy) in aeronautics, helicopters and armoured vehicles; 
Nexter (former Giat, of France) and Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (Germany) in major battle tanks 
and armoured vehicles; Thyssen Krupp (Germany), Fincantieri (Italy) and DCNS (France) in 
naval vessels and logistic support. 
Tier 1 contractors are the specialised systems, complete sub-systems or major 
components producers: these are often specialized firms which are subcontracted by the prime 
contractors. Often, these are also risk sharing partners. Solid example of such company is Rolls 
Royce (UK) specializing in defence aero-engine products. It has registered 24.20% of its revenue 
to come from defence related contracts in 2016.
12
 Alongside, great examples of these contractors  
are Safran Group(France) producing systems and equipment for aerospace, defense and security, 
Rheimetall (Germany) leading producers of systems and equipment for ground, air and naval 
forces. 
Tier 2 contractors are producers of wide range of supplementary components and supply 
services: electrical & electronic equipment, mechanical engineering, metal working, casts & 
moulds, etc., along with a variety of services. Typically tier 2 contractors are small and medium 
enterprises (SME) or subsidiaries of the major defence producers (prime contractors and 
subcontractors). These contractors usually operate at the margin of the defence sector as they 
often supply dual-use goods and services. Therefore, they are frequently not listed as defence 
producers. 
 Tier 3 contractors are commodity providers and general service suppliers, as well as 
capacity contractors. This level also includes all providers of general economic infrastructure 
services (logistics, communications, education, etc.). Companies on this level of supply chain 
compromise small and medium enterprises that are subsidiaries of producers higher in the chain. 
These contractors supply dual-use products and usually are not listed as defence producers.
13
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 Rolls Royce Holding Plc., Annual Report 2016, London, 2016. Available at https://www.rolls-
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The position on value chain indicates how countries and companies are affected to changes 
within international arms market. Formation of a new major company by a merger or 
acquisitions can lead to emergence of a new significant competitor within global defence market. 
This, in turn, may provoke rationalization and consolidation of the supply chain. Thus, 
companies on the lower position on the chain frequently find themselves in rather thought 
conditions. In times of austerity shrinking national demand, costly regulation, time consumption 
and lack of financing make it complicated for smaller producers to enter the defence market. 
A gradual shift in relations between producers on the different level of the value chain has been 
occurring. As in the past, relations down the value chain were based upon transactions relating to 
cost and efficiency. For instance, the initial upfront investment for weapon contractures is 
numerous and with five-to ten-year life cycles being the norm for weapon systems, it can take a 
long time for the companies to profit. Thus, it may potentially leave the tier 1
st
 constructors 
financially vulnerable.  
For example, for a massive project such as the development of a recent Rolls-Royce engine, it 
takes up to five years to develop the product and every time it is ordered, it could be in service 
for up to 30 years. Thus, the project would potentially boost the suppliers’ revenue on weapon 
maintenance. Taking into account the potential benefits for these constructors, it seems logical 
that by sharing some of the investment they could also qualify for the rewards.  
Thus, in order to raise the efficiency and minimalize cost-related risks, constructors tend to 
implement “risk and revenue sharing” system. This system allows redistribution of the 
development costs of new equipment and weapon systems among the prime constructors and its 
partners within the value chain. By forging risk-sharing partnerships, tier 1
st
 manufacturers can 




However, the risk and revenue sharing system has more than just financial implications to it. 
Previously, interactions within the chain were mostly transactional. However, in the risk-sharing 
system of partnership, by its nature of co-dependency, the long-term relations are build united 
the suppliers and manufactures under a common goal. These partnerships based not only on 
simple contractual obligation, common long-running objectives facilitate integration of ideas, 
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 Jones, Chris. “United we stand, divided we fall: Supply chain consolidation and the rise of risk-sharing partners”. 
MRO, June 2015. 
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knowledge and skills. The united effort expands capabilities, and it all derives from the 
collective investment that is risk-sharing system. 
15
 
2.2. DEFENCE TECHNOLOGY, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
As it has been described above the defence industry is unique in many ways, as it 
compromises the mixture of numerous industrial sectors, actors and technologies. It is a 
combination of various industries and/or companies that are incorporated into supply chain for 
the military. Thus, it includes all industrial sectors and technologies that are relevant and 
involved in generating defence-related products and services. Along with others branches, arms 
industry sector includes explicitly dual-use products and services, such as electronics, IT, 
logistics, as well as companies which mainly operate in the civilian sector.  
As the dual-use products and services has been a great part of DTIB for a long time, it has 
affected policies and statistics making it challenging to reckon the defence sector. However, the 
techonogy diffusion between military and civil dimensions varies for different industry sectors – 
the Air, Land, Naval and Electronics. 
Figure 1: Defence industrial sectors related to Civil, Dual Use and Military 
applications. 
 
Source: Briani, Valerio and Marrone, Alessandro, et al. The Development of a European Defence Technological and 
Industrial Base (EDTIB). Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, June 2013, p.16 
 







Research and Development provides the basis for nearly every large-scale arm system delivery. 
As it was described above, the term indicates all industrial activities related to development of a 
platform, system, or subparts of them and complementary goods. Defence Research and 
Technology (R&T) as a sub-set of R&D refers to expenditures for basic research, applied 
research and technology demonstration for defence purposes. Therefore, the intensity of R&T 
within R&D spending is an important indicator for the degree of development of an industrial 
sector: more money devoted to R&D – the more advanced capabilities will be developed and the 
more innovation products will be delivered.
16
 
According to the European Defence Agency, the European Union defence investment into 
equipment procurement and R&D has been on constant decline since 2011. A trend that started 
with 11.6% real decrease in 2011 and followed by another fall of 9.1% in 2014. Taking into 
account already relatively low investments into R&D, this industrial sector has been heavily 
affected by the drop of 15% in the equipment procurement in 2014. However, the share of R&D 
spending in total defence expenditure has been slowly increasing and stood at around 4.3% 
between 2006 and 2014.  However, in real terms R&D expenditure decreased by around EUR 2 
billion or 18.5% from 2006 up to 2014. 
17
 This trend of constant decrease in R&D is even more 
illustrative if to look into expenditure by EU-28,  where R&D on defence made up a negligible 
part of government expenditure in all countries except the United Kingdom (0.2 % of GDP) and 
France (0.1 % of GDP).
18
 As figure below indicates, resources allocated to R&T by European 
governments remains too little over the years. (See Figure 2) 
Addressing the lack of funding of the R&D, the European Union agreed to a number of fresh 
initiatives designed to articulate a new level of ambition for security and defence in 2016. With 
the Commission presented its European Defence Action Plan (EDAP) on 30 November 2016, the 
EU member states have agreed to stimulate demand by encouraging increase in investment, 
advancing towards strategic autonomy by developing military capabilities and strengthening 
industrial competitiveness by supporting R&D. In other words, it can be summarised as 
providing funds for European defence, therefore ensuring investment in the supply chain and 
strengthening the single market. 
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17
 EDA Press Center. “Aggregated defence data 2014 and 2015 (estimated)”. European Defence Agency, June 07, 
2016. Available at https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-news/2016/06/07/aggregated-
defence-data-2014-and-2015-(estimated) 
18





Figure 2: Defence R&T as a percent of total defence expenditure in the EU 
  
Source: Violakis P., 2016, p. 180. 
A new European Defence Fund is to start on a small scale in 2017, with pilot project funding 
drone, cyber defence and maritime surveillance research. The programme is expected to run 
from 2018-2019, starting small with a budget of around €25 million.
19
 It is expected that this 
budget allocation could grow to a total of EUR 90 million until 2020. Under the post-2020 EU 
multiannual financial framework, the Commission intends to propose a dedicated defence 
research programme with an estimated amount of EUR 500 million per year.
20
 
2.3. THE DEMAND SIDE 
Over last decades the structure of defence industry and its restructuring process has been 
strongly influenced by trends in military expenditure and redistribution of procurement budgets 
within the EU. Although global real military spending has been growing since 1960, the median 
share of military expenditure as % of GDP has fallen since the end of the Cold War. This 
indicates that, on average, countries are allocating more of their income to nondefense spending. 
Following the end of the Cold War, European governments preferred re-investing the “peace 
                                                          
19
 Eanna Kelly. “Why the EU needs to start spending on defence R&D” paper presented at the European Defence 
Procurement Conference, September 22, 2016. Available at http://www.eudefenceprocurement.com/single-
post/2016/10/13/Why-the-EU-needs-to-start-spending-on-defence-RD  
20




dividend” into states’ welfare programmes.
21
 However, with a number of defence assets have 
been privatized and defence budget being reduced, the European governments have straggled to 
streamline procurement projects from the Cold-War era and to re-orient them into efficient 
industry configuration required in modern times.
22
 Alongside, downfall in sources allocated to 
defence resulted in major reduction in capacity and procurement orders (both national 
procurement and arms exports) in the European defence industry between 1990 and 2003. Arms 
industries have followed the pattern with many rationalization and consolidation initiatives 
taking place. Restructuring of the industry resulted in various merges and acquisition, which in 
turn led to emergence of the new names among the top European arms companies, such as BAE 
Systems, EADS and Thales. With fewer but larger European arms producers entering the 
defence market, some arms firms have dropped out of the top group or have been forced to exit 
the industry.  
Despite the restructuring attempts of EU-28, with a different degree of success, and a slight 
increase in nominal spending in the Western Europe, effective European defence budgets in real 
terms have decreased constantly. (See figure 3) A slight decrease in the share of defence 
expenditure compared to total expenditure were noted over 2002-2015 (2002: 1.5 % of GDP vs. 




Figure 3: EU-28 Military Expenditure in % of GDP after the Cold-War 
 
Source: The World Bank| SIPRI: Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. 2016 
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2.4. CRITICALITY OF GLOBAL MARKETS AND ARMS TRANSFERS 
In recent times nearly every defence producing company and state are largely depended 
on foreign sales. For many of them the foreign trade has become vital for the survival and 
maintenance of efficient DTIBs. Meanwhile, the global market in defence goods and services has 
grown into highly competitive and complex space. While the majority of exporters are located in 
the West, the certain tendency of favoring the importers from the rest of the world has occurred. 
This, in turn, led to increase in application of various incentive practices such as foreign direct 
investments, technology and knowledge transfers, offsets.  
With the end of the Cold War the structure of global arms market has changed dramatically. 
Many national defence industries have shifted from single country to transnational production. 
For many of them it was the only possibility to keep up a sufficient DTIB. During the Cold War, 
European arms manufacturers tended to sell as much weapons as possible in order to protect 
production lines and employment. However, with the end of the Cold War, shrinking domestic 
defense budgets intensified pressures to internationalize, diversify and restructure defence 
industries in Europe. Multinational production became more attractive due its potential cost-
efficiency. As the result a bunch of new regional companies entered the international arms 
market: BAE Systems, EADS, Fimeccanica and Thales.  
With the globalization process the different form of military-civil interaction in technology. The 
dual use technology became broadly available around the world; meanwhile the military industry 
has expanded itself into area of information technology.  
In regards to global trends in defence trade, in aftermath the Cold War global arms exports 
dropped significantly. However, European companies were able to recover faster than those of 
the former Soviet Union. As it is indicated in the Figure 4, European arms exports fall 
dramatically in early 1990s and early 2000s, however were able to rise back every time.  
As it was mentioned above, the military expenditures of the EU countries have visibly decreased 
in the last few years. This means that fewer arms are sold on the internal European market. The 
European defence industry is therefore more and more dependent on exports that occasionally 
decrease as well.
24
 According to SIPRI, the top five West European suppliers—France, 
Germany, the UK, Spain and Italy—together accounted for 21.7 per cent of global arms transfers 
in 2012–16. However, many top arms exporters in the EU have seen the decrease in their 
revenues in comparison to 2007-11 period, with only Italy and the UK notably increasing their 
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arms exports. The combined arms exports by European Union (EU) member states accounted for 
26 per cent of the global total in 2012–16, a 9.8 per cent decrease compared with 2007–11.
25
 
Figure 4: The European Union value of arms exports in billion USD, 1988-
2015 
 
Source: SIPRI database 2016| World Bank database 
 
2.5. DRIING FACTORS CHANGING EDTIB 
As it was briefly described above, national DTIB operates in a specific regime influenced 
by various politico- and socio-economic incentives. These incentives impose pressure on the 
DTIB for change and therefore potentially affect the way certain national DTIBs are developed 
and incorporated into the EDTIB. Some of the driving factors also serve as intermediate 
variables for this research and will be described below. (see figure) Importantly, many of the 
drivers are interconnected and mutually depended; therefore they are re-appeared in different set 
of factors.
26
 (See Figure 5) 
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Figure 5: Driving factors changing EDTIB 
 
Source: Bekkers, F. et al. Development of a European Defence Technological and 
Industrial Base. Main report. TNO, 2009. p.31 
 
2.5.1. NATIONAL POLICY DRIVERS 
The defence industries is highly influenced by national policies, such as defence and 
security policy including adopting and redistributing defence budgets; industrial policy; research 
and innovation policy; regulative and instrumental framework for the defence industry within the 
state.   
For instance, the defence industry budgets reflect and constitute the demand for firms. As since 
the end of the Cold War the military expenditures were broadly reduced, the defence firms tend 
to move into the wider security sector and/or search for new export opportunities elsewhere 
outside the EU, thus, reshaping the composition of national defence industries as well as EDTIB.  
The other important factor in this category is public/private partnership. It reflects the trend of 
development of certain public-private partnership with increase in practice of leasing of specific 
service goods. Although EU member states are less inclined to outsource core military 
programmes, it is quite likely that an increasing number of services traditionally performed in-
house, such as administrative, communication, logistics and information serves, will be obtained 
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from the market. The reluctance to share the responsibility for the goods among member states 
keeps their public-private partnerships low, thus potentially negatively affects sufficiency of the 
defence industry sector.  
Going further, defence industry ownership factor is one of a great importance. Many of the 
present prime contractors and other defence firms are partly or fully owned by a government, 
having a golden share in stakes. In many EU member states public ownership ensures security of 
supply, while providing means for operational independency and sovereignty. It also gives an 
opportunity to support national industry and maintaining employment level. On the other hand, 
the state’s ownership of defence producers slows influences the development of multinational 
cooperation and limits opportunities for contractors to enter the international market. Less 
government ownership may lead to increase productivity, competitiveness and efficiency of 
DTIB, giving it an opportunity to redistribute production chains among the most cost-efficient 
entities. 
2.5.2. ECONOMIC DRIVING FACTORS 
This category consists with economic factors that influence development of the defence 
industry. It is evident, that the economic environment pressures have a great impact on national 
and EU DTIBs. In the light of recent economic crisis in the EU, available financial resources for 
defence research and production have decreased notably. In other words, economic pressures 
post certain constrains on defence industry development, such as downsize of national 
procurement programmes or re-location of the resources. Economic driving factors can be 




Factor conditions constitute of availability of high-skilled human resources, know-hows and 
capital resources. As DTIB is a highly knowledge-based industry, it requires a highly competent 
workforce, necessary capital for investment in new technologies and innovations. The 
availability of required quality and quantity of skilled labor has a major impact on the DTIB 
development. The defence industry is highly innovative and technically advanced sector, which 
cannot function without highly-skilled and educated personnel. Taking into account that R&D is 
of great importance for the DTIB, the lack of necessary workforce can and will affect the 
evolution of the DTIB. With the shortage of the personnel the competition will decrease as well 
as industry’s capacity to develop advanced weapon systems. Alongside the availability of skilled 
workforce, the access to necessary capital is crucial for the DTIB. In order to maintain 
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competitive and advanced DTIB, states need to invest heavily to keep up with the market or gave 
up their stakes in national defence producers for a privatization. As DTIB is a capital-intensive 
industry, it requires considerable investments in order to grow. With the lack of capital, the 
defence production may suffer significantly, thus affecting sufficiency of DTIB. 
Other economic factors that influence development of DTIB and have been described above are 
increasing integration between civil and defence industries, globalization of the defence market,  
level of consolidation of European defence firms and market constrains (such as barriers to entry 
and exit). 
2.5.3. SOCIETAL DRIVING FACTORS 
National defence industrial policy is a subject to a great socio-economic pressure. 
Societal factors have a major impact on the perception and objectives of military activities. 
Moreover, as defence industrial sector is capital-intensive, national decision-makers are often 
face a hard decision on where to allocate resources, for instant whether to invest in defence 
equipment or into welfare. Over the years the voice of public has become stronger with various 
activists group campaigning against increasing funding for military activities and defence 
production for a various reasons (e.g. environmental, religious, pacifistic, etc.).  
Changing demographic of population, rise of global migration, environmental and sustainable 
challenges - all these factors have direct or indirect impact on DTIB development as part of the 
broader security strategy. The combination of various factors may influence public opinion, thus 
justify more robust defence industry development or otherwise.
28
 
2.5.4. EUROPEAN UNION POLICY FACTORS 
  These drivers include the policy trends and institutional developments that are 
developed within the political context of the EU and have impact on the structure of the DIB. 
The EU political factors are originate from the EU institutions, such as the European 
Commission, European Defence Agency and the Council of the European Union, and delivered 
in various EU policy papers, directives and documents.  
Under the analysis of these documents it is possible to highlight several important drivers that 
influence development of national defence industries within EDTIB. For example, the 
development of a coordinated EU policy on defence and security and its implementation may 
enhance the structure, efficiency and equality of the EDTIB. As well as consolidation of the 
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demand side, streamlining procurement procedures, enhancing intra-EU trade of defence 
equipment, services and know-hows may lead to development of a more open and sufficient 
European defence equipment market, and potentially influence domestics DTIBs. The EU 
political factors are presented in the figure: Driving factors of changing EDTIB and will be 
analysed in more details in next chapters of this research. 
2.5.5. TECHNOLOGICAL DRIVING FACTORS 
Technological progress is of importance for defence industry and military as whole. 
Highly-advanced defence industry may not be developed without cutting-edge technologies. 
With the market so dynamic and competitive, defence industries have to adopt quickly. For 
example, with the innovation comes the change in supply side. New technologies developed not 
just in a military field but also in civil sector may greatly impact defence production, leading to 
development of new products and its applications. Going further, the growing interconnection 
between military and civil sector technologies enforce the technological progress for both sides. 
The change in military demands requires new adjustments in products and services, which come 
with new trends in innovation. Therefore, constantly changing demand and supply trends re-














3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF 
EUROPEAN DEFENCE COOPERATION 
The Maastricht Treaty
29
 (formally, the Treaty on European Union or TEU) brought 
defence policy into the EU for the first time on 7 February 1992. Since then, the defence policy 
cooperation in Europe has been formalized within legal and institutional framework. However, 
arrangements to make it efficient through the Western European Union were quite unsuccessful, 
that resulted in the weak military presence of the EU in the Balkans in the 1990s. 
Sharing the conviction that the EU should play a greater role in the world, the United Kingdom 
and France proposed at the Saint-Malo Summit in 1998 to develop the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP), which would be aimed to cope with challenges of effective crisis 
management. Next year their joint initiative was adopted by the European Council in Cologne 
alongside with the appointment of Javier Solana as High Representative for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy.  As the Cologne communiqué put it: 
 “The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible 
military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond 
to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO".
30
 
Details of the new approach were elaborated at the Helsinki European Council in 
December 1999 and have been summarized under the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG).  They 
included ambitious force goals to be implemented by 2003, particularly a corps level of up to 
60,000 troops available in 60 days and to be expected to remain in the theatre for one year in 
order to fully address set of scenarios established in Peterberg tasks (1992), i.e. humanitarian and 
rescue tasks, peace-keeping and peace-making tasks as well as tasks of combat forces in crisis 
management.
31
 Along mentioned, the HHG included new command, control and politico-
military structures (Military Committee, Military Staff, political control by the Political and 
Security Committee) and ambitious capabilities on the civilian (civ-mil) side to promote 
preventive action to avoid a war as well as to establish the peace.
32
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Furthermore, European Security Strategy (ESS) has provided the coherent framework for policy 
in this area.
33
  The new strategy, originally adopted in 2003 and revised in the light of changing 
security circumstances in 2008, defines strategic objectives and set out the potential threats to 
Europe. It points out the necessity of the EU member states to become active, capable and 
coherent as well as importance of further development of defence cooperation and integration. 
The main five threats identified in ESS: terrorism, weapon of mass destruction, regional 
conflicts, failure of states and organized crime. Importantly, The ESS has had a direct impact on 
the ESDP: it led to comprehensive review and update of the capability goals, which were 
translated into concrete military objectives under Headline Goal 2010 (HG 2010)
34
. 
3.1. HELSINKI HEADLINE GOAL 2010 
In May 2004 EU member states agreed to “commit themselves to be able by 2010 to 
respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum 
of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty”.
35
  Therefore, the EU ability to deploy 
rapid reaction forces to response a crisis was defined as a key element of the Headline Goal 2010 
and to be implemented in form of EU-Battlegroups (BG). Precisely, BG units of about 1500 
troops  to be composed of national or multinational forces and have to be deployable at any one 
time in a six-monthly rotation, at very short notice, for urgent and short operations. Furthermore, 
the ESS comprised following capability development targets presented in the Table
36
 below: 
Table 2: Helsinki Headline Goal 2010 
Capability to be deployed Implemented by 
Establishment of a civil-military cell within the EUMS 2004 
Establishment of the Agency in the field of defence capability 
development, research, acquisition and armaments (European Defence 
Agency) 
2005 
EU Strategic lift joint coordination, with a view to achieving by 2010 
necessary capacity and full efficiency in strategic lift (air, land and sea) 
in support of anticipated operations; 
2004 
Specifically for Airlift: the transformation of the EACC into the EAC is 2008 
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welcomed, as is the intention on the part of some Member States who so 
wish to develop a European Airlift command fully efficient by 2010 
Developing appropriate compatibility and network linkage of all 
communications equipment and assets both terrestrial and space based 
2010 
Source: Sophie-Charlotte Brune and Christian Molling. The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European 
Defence. European Parliament, Directorate General for External Policies, 2011, pp.20-21. 
Importantly, the development from the HHG to the HG 2010 designated the learning 
process has been taken place within the context of European Defence cooperation and 
integration. In general, the HG2010 was adopted to remedy the capability shortfalls have been 
recognized in the implementation of the HHG. The HG2010 aimed to link EU’s capability 
development process with a new framework of recent institutional innovations such as the ESS 
and newly-established European Defence Agency (EDA). Unlike its predecessor, the HG2010 
could build upon a consensus, reached within the EU in the form of the ESS, over the definition 
of threats, possible scenarios, the means to address them, and further role of military force. In 
contrast to the HHG, which was focused on platforms, numbers and available capabilities, the 
HG 2010 had a more qualitative approach: it focused more on the capabilities needed to develop 
the EU militaries into more flexible, mobile forces and enable them to address new threats. 
While the HHG was geared to the Balkan wars and focused in particular on quantitative targets, 
the HG 2010 focused on crisis management and qualitative targets. The force generation process 
under the new Headline Goal became more transparent. This in turn facilitated its adoption and 
increased its acceptance among EU Member States.
37
  
Nonetheless, the overall method of governance within Headline Goals remained unchanged; 
there was still no sanction mechanism to monitor the commitments of the Member States. In 
other words, the HG 2010 contributed more in an adjusting the list of goals and tasks rather 
improving method of governance that was already hardly functional within the HHG. Going 
further, there was already a certain tendency within EU defence sector: the market and industry 
were still mostly excluded from the EU integration process and the EU single market traditions. 
As under EU law the armament sector de facto is exempted from the EU integration process, the 
several attempts by the European Commision to introduce several structural changes to improve 
defence cooperation and procurement faced strong resistance from the national governments. 
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3.2. EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY 
The disappointing results of the capability development review called for the 
development of comprehensive solutions in this area to be undertaken collectively. France and 
the UK developed the idea of the EU Agency to encourage Member States to improve their 
defence capabilities.  As a result, in 2004 a Joint Action of the European Council established the 
European Defence Agency (EDA) which was a step towards rationalization of EU military 
capacity. The rationale behind the formation of EDA was affirmation of existing problems 
within EU member states military capabilities and armament cooperation. Functionally, the 
agency serves as a coordinator between the EU-institutions, national governments, multinational 
defence organizations and the defence companies. Its mandate compromises nearly all aspects of 
the armaments sector in Europe: Capabilities, Research and Technology, Armament and Industry 




However, the EDA’s capacity remains very limited to the political willingness of the Member 
States. Taking into account the difficulties within EU defence cooperation mentioned before, it is 
not surprising that the success of the EDA has so far been limited. Starting with a very broad 
mandate, the agency soon felt the limitations imposed by the national governments. The first 
projects have severely suffered from the ongoing influence of the intergovernmental approach 
that interferes with economic rules of the Single Market in regard to the armaments sector.  
The Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) in 2007 came with the several structural reforms in the ESDP-
related issues, the prime of which was to rename the ESDP to Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP).
39
 Furthermore, it was agreed to create the post of High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, while the head of Military Committee became the 
top military advisor to this post. The EU Military Committee (EUMC), which consists of the 
member states’ Defence Chiefs represented by permanent envoys, undertakes the top advisory 
role to the EU in this summit. In the meantime, the Political and Security Committee provides 
monitoring and advisory services to the High Representative.  
Following the adoption of the HG2010, the EU Military Committee tasked the EU Military Staff 
(EUMS) in coordination with other Council Secretariat bodies to analyse the capabilities that the 
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Member States could provide to ESDP and identified the EU’s shortfalls to fulfill the tasks set 
out in the Headline Goal 2010. In order to address existing shortfalls, the EDA issued the Long 
Term Vision Report, which underlined the key aspects of the capability development EU 
Member States should concentrate on. Particularly, the key issues are: knowledge exploitation 
(intelligence, information and analysis); interoperability (equipment and systems; manpower 
balance; rapid acquisition; Industrial policy (increasing investment and consolidating the 
European Defence Technological and Industrial Base); flexibility in the case of the unforeseen.
40
 
Based on the aspects outlined in the Report, the EDA in collaboration with EUMS and the 
Council Secretariat proceed to issue the Capability Development Plan (CDP). It provides a more 
realistic structured and systematic approach to Member States in terms of capacity building 
process. The CDP was established in order to facilitate EUMS’ decision making process in realm 
of national capability choices and perspectives; encourage their further cooperation; and enable 
the development and following launch of new joint programmes which correspond current and 
future capability shortfalls.
41
 By that time, the EDA formulate the list of initial capability areas 
for Member States to focus on.
42
 Importantly, the CDP was a starting point for capability 
development initiatives which reflected current condition of the national defence sectors within 
EU. 
Despite all mentioned declaration, plans and initiatives, the original outlines of the Headline 
Goal 2003 had been not completely implemented. Nevertheless, in December 2008 Member 
States signed the new Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities with even more ambitious goals. 
It describes scenarios in which the Union wants to be able to intervene, and the means with 
which it would do so. This six page segment outlines a significantly increased quantity of 
capabilities, based on the 2003 goals (60 000 troops deployable in 60 days), but with a more 
ambitious framework, such as the ability to simultaneously conduct two major operations of up 
to 10 000 troops plus a civilian contingent for 2 years; two rapid response operations using inter 
alia EU-Battlegroups; a civilian-military humanitarian assistance mission up to 90 days; and 
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around one dozen ESDP civilian missions of varying formats with a major mission (up to 3000 
experts) to last several years.
43
  
The declaration also called for the establishment of a European air transport fleet; an airlift 
command and an airbase for a European force; observation satellites (the MUSIS programme) 
and taking account of military requirements in space surveillance. In terms of harmonisation, it 
set outs the development a military exchange programme and improvement in the structure and 
the functioning of the European Security and Defence College. Moreover the declaration stressed 
the necessity of pooling of efforts are to be explored further, by looking at new methods for 
multinational management of assets, joint capabilities, collective capacity and voluntary 
specialisation provision through mutual interdependence.
44
 
A problem of the Headline Goals and the Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities
45
 is that 
even through certain progress has been done, they tend to include rather quantitative than 
qualitative goals. The level of ambition has not yet been translated into a new step-by-step plan 
to generate the necessary sources for its implementation. The character of crisis management is 
also shifting from traditional military tasks. Future engagements should to have more civilian 
component in order to cope with complexity of environment. Currently the EU only has civilian 
or military capabilities; neither of them is genuinely made for integrated scenarios. The EU 
Member States’ defence industry sectors have to adapt themselves to integrated environments on 
a case-by-case basis. While the new level of ambition addresses the complexity of crisis 
scenarios, this is not reflected in the capability-development process, where civil and military 
demands continue to be treated separately. Frankly, the Declaration seemed to only widen the 
gap between available and intended capabilities.  
European responses to global and local security threats and challenges have mainly come from 
the member states, with few concerted actions taking place at EU level. Moreover, the EU has a 
very limited budget for defence and security matters in contrast with other policies. For instance, 
the EDA’s budget for 2015 was EUR 30.5 million — EUR 24.4 to cover the personnel and 
general costs.
46
 While the scope of funding of the European Parliament pilot project on CSDP 
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remains at EUR 1.5 million for the fiscal years 2016 and 2017.
47
 Therefore, the collaboration 
among Member States in security and defence has been far from desired. 
3.3. EUROPEAN DEFENCE ACTION PLAN 2016 
In order to address constantly changing security treats and rising gap between military 
and civil domains, in 2016 the EU has adapted its strategic framework. The newly-published EU 
Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) aims to bring together all means and 
tools for the EU to act as a coherent and efficient actor on the international arena.  
Regarding security and defence policy, the EUGS represents the new ambition level for the 
CSDP. Under the EUGS the European Commission introduced the new European Defence 
Action Plan (EDAP) which is focused on opening new avenues for underpinning military 
capabilities through future funding of research and procurement in the EU.
48
  The EDAP marks a 
certain shift in the European Commission’s approach towards European defence, as it unlocks 
possibilities to fund defence related activities and projects through the EU budget, particularly – 
the European Defence Fund. (EDF).As the Commission seeks to strengthen competiveness and 
openness of the EDEM, support further cooperation in defence procurement and to help EU-28 
to benefit from liberalizations of the defence markets, the actions proposed in the EDAP are 
aimed to support further development of defence and security capabilities among the member 
states.  
The EDF consist of two separated but complementary “windows” – a research window and a 
capability window. 
- A research window through which the Commission supports collaborative defence 
research. Between 2017 and 2020, €90 million will be made available to this end under 
the Preparatory Action (PA) .The Commission proposes to spend €500 million annually 
under the 2021-2027 Multi-annual Financial Framework. 
-  A capability window which brings together member states’ investments in collaborative 
capability development, with an estimated total worth of €5 billion annually. The 
capability window consists of an ‘umbrella structure’ open to all member states and 
specific projects in which several member states jointly procure capabilities. To get 
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member states to pool their resources under this window, the Commission offers several 
financial incentives. For example, contributions to the EDF will be discounted from the 




Going further, the EDAP potentially may create more favorable conditions for the integration of 
national supply chains, by establishing new opportunity for the European Investment Bank to 
provide loans for SMEs. Alongside, the new EU financial instruments can lead to establishment 
of a new framework for cooperation in European Defence. Indeed, as of 2021, EU funding 
would certainly require more robust managing structures. This would open new avenues for 
European capability priority‐setting, planning tools and framework for defence cooperation, and 
would thus channel future European defence funding towards European strategic autonomy.
50
  
3.4. LEGAL UNDERPININGS 
As in absence of literal definition of ‘defence’ notion in the EU Treaty, it is possible to 
distinguish two main dimensions to the term by EU law within the context of CSDP. According 
to the Article 42 (2) TEU: 
‘The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a 
common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European 
Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States 




Thus, there is a clear distinction between ‘common defence policy’ and ‘common 
defence’ in the Treaty of Lisbon: where the first is addressed on EU level, thus is one of EU 
competence; and the last is rather optional and largely dependent on political will of EU member 
states. 
As was mentioned before, ‘common defence policy’ formation is well elaborated and 
conceptualized by the ToL and its predecessors. The CSDP includes coherent legal 
infrastructure; set of multidimensional tasks and goals; and developed institutional framework. 
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With regard to ‘common defence’ as the second conceptual dimension of the CSDP, the 
elaboration of common Union defence policy to ‘common defence’ will have to be adopted by 
the Member States. Thus, despite the ambitious HG 2003 and the Declaration on Strengthening 
Capabilities calls for self-sustaining EU forces, the CSDP legal framework determines that 
member states are still prime actors in policy agenda-setting and its further implementation. 
Therefore, EU law does not challenge prime position of state actors in defense policy neither 
does it opposes NATO’s role in European Security. Thus, the relevant provisions of the Lisbon 
Treaty are not likely to accelerate integration which will correspond to the intergovernmental 
nature of the CSDP. This make a case especially since the principle of unanimity remains a 
cornerstone of security and defence cooperation in the EU. While Qualified Majority Voting 
applies in some cases for the CFSP, it is excluded altogether when it comes to decisions in 
regards military or defence areas. Thus, it is possible to argue that legal framework of the CSDP 
preserves the primacy of national sovereignty and as it was stated in ToL that national security 
remains the sole responsibility of each Member State. 
3.5. LEGAL ASPECTS OF DEFENCE PROCUREMENT IN THE EU 
Although EU Single Market has been quite successful in establishing the free movements 
of goods, services, people and capital, which in turn led to noticeable increase in trade and 
lowering of prices; EU has not succeed to transfer these economic freedoms towards European 
Defence Industry. It is still highly fragmented along national boundaries.  
Perhaps the most significant difference between acquisition of public goods and of defence 
goods by national governments may lies within its sensitive nature, which in extreme case may 
mean the national survival. Therefore, there is a certain level of secrecy and strategic importance 
of national defence procurement process, which legitimately prompts the member states to 
protect local markets and to rely largely on national suppliers in order to retain a certain degree 
of autonomy and reactivity. This tendency of the defence market separation has resulted in 
twenty-eight compartmentalized national markets with different rules, standards and 
administrations. The lack of a coherent internal market of armaments limits the scope of market 
competition, thus hinders further development of defence industrial sector. Ultimately it 
threatens the growth and even the survival of European defence industries, on which Europe’s 
own defence capacity relies.
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Currently, EU defence procurement legal norms fall under the EU Treaties and ‘Defence’ 
Directives’ subordination. Despite attempts to harmonize national defence procurement laws 
through EU legislation, Member States are still reluctant to inscribe aspects related to defence 
procurement into EU law. 
Continuing with EU law, Article 346 TEU allows national governments to refuse multinational 
defence and security contracts if the implementation of them would undermine essential security 
interests. Article 346 (1)(a) allows EU countries to keep secret any information the disclosure of 
which they consider contrary to their essential security interests. Article 346 (1)(b) allows EU 
countries ‘… [to] take measures as it considers necessary … for the protection of the essential 
security interests… connected with production of trade military items…’.  Measures taken under 
Article 346 (1)(b) may not adversely affect competition on the common market for products not 
specifically intended for military purposes. Although the European Commission highlighted in 
an interpretive communication that Article 346 should be treated as an exception rather than the 
norm, in  reality it is difficult to define what supposed to be ‘necessary for the protection of the 
essential interests of its security’ and under what circumstances this reference may be eligible.
53
 
Thus, it is possible to argue that area of defence procurement is de facto excluded from the EU 
integration process.  
The EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive 2009/81/EC was adopted by the European 
Parliament and the Council in 2009 in order to open up the EU defence industry to cross-border 
competition. Furthermore, one of the main objectives was to facilitate EU defence market’s 
development by establishing a formal framework for cross-border defence procurement within 
the EU. This directive is focused on the sensitive issues around security of information and 




Although the integration of the Directive into national laws was challenging, many states have 
also transposed non- compulsory subcontracting provisions. As it is one of great importance for 
strengthening the EDTIB and development of the openness of the defence market, the European 
Commission through EDA tool regularly monitors the use of exclusions and termination of 
existed agreements. Starting September 2011and up to March 2015, more than 3500 contracts 
have been awarded under the Directive representing a total of €34 500 millions. These contracts 
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were published in TED, the official EU Public Procurement portal which covers all procurement 
announcements covered by EU legislation.
55
 (See Figure 6) 
Figure 6: Reported and estimated value of contract award notices published 
under the Directive, by year [value in million EUR] 
 
Source: OJ/TED, manual corrections by DG GROW
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The second important EU instrument for regulating defence procurement law is the Directive 
2009/43/EC which was adopted in order to simplify terms and conditions for transfer of defence-
related products within the EU. It intends to ease cooperation of defence-related industries and 
functioning of EU internal market.  The scope of defence-related products is set out in the 
Derictive’s Annex which has to be updated regularly under the terms of Article 13(1) TEU, so 
that it strictly corresponds to the Common Military List of the European Union.
57
 
Main tasks of the Directive include but no limited to stimulation of common production projects, 
erasing trade barriers for defined defence-related products and consolidation of the internal 
market.  The new rules were also intended to create opportunities for small and medium-sized 
enterprises in the defence sector to join the supply chain within member states, thus 
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strengthening the DTIB.  It was believed that the efficiency of export controls in the EU would 
increase; therefore the risk of illicit transfers would be reduced. 
Although the Directive contained a transposition period of more than two years after its 
publication in the Official Journal of the EU, a timely transposition seemed to have been quite 
challenging for several member states. A real problem arises with the updating of the Annex to 
the Derective, which is supposed to coincide with the Common Military List of the EU  at every 
time, nonetheless in practice it is out of synch for at least half of the given year.
58
 
Prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, in the time of adaptation of defence procurement secondary 
legislation, which was anaysed before, there was a parallel development of the former Second 
Pillar, particularly the establishment of the European Defence Agency under the Article 42(3) 
TEU.  The EDA is a centralized European defence procurement agency, which was set up by a 
Council Join Action within CSFP, where all Member States are participants with exception of 
Denmark.
59
 Its main tasks are to promote European defence cooperation by opening up 
armaments markets within EU and establishing fair competition. Under the ToL, Article 45 TEU 
provides for the institutionalisation of the EDA within the legal framework of the CSDP. Thus, 
the Agency represents a legal body of the CSDP and acts under the EU framework. It enables the 
participants to establish cooperation and develop administrative arrangements with third parties 
while being party of legal proceedings. 
Importantly, the EDA is not aimed to duplicate already existing collaborative programmes in the 
EU but mostly to support the Member States and Council in improving defence capabilities 
within a voluntary and non-binding intergovernmental framework. It is expected that all public 
contracts have to be put out to tender and would be awarded by the EDA on behalf of the 
Member States. Nonetheless, the EDA procurement rules should not prejudice the measures 
adopted by Member States invoking the exception clause of Article 346 TFEU or Articles 10 and 
14 of the Public Sector Directive 2004/18/EC.
60
 
Despite its intend to facilitate defence cooperation towards deeper EU integration, the EDA’s 
possibilities are limited. First of all, as was noted before, its activities are strongly depended on 
the Member States’ interests and willingness. For instance, as the Agency is not an armament 
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acquisition agency, the Member States still can indicate it as a central purchasing body for 
selected initiatives. It, in turn, makes it uncertain in regard of applying the public procurement 
Directives as they were adopted in order to harmonise national procurements process rather than 
to be used towards EU agencies. Secondly, as the EDA has no influence over the participant’s 
essential security interests, it is no able by itself to invoke the Article 346 TFEU to derogate 
from the Treaties’ application; it is up to the Member States to decide whether to apply the 
Directives it in relation to EDA procurement programmes. Finally, the EDA is not yet a 
coordinator of defence procurement programme. It manages projects under the Member States’ 
supervision; it is financed and directed by them.
61
 Nevertheless, the EDA was the first agency to 
bring European cooperation within defence sector under the umbrella of EU law. As such it 
contributed to the progress within the area of European defence cooperation by addressing the 
existing capabilities gap in the EU. 
3.6. CONCLUSION 
As this section examined the various initiatives were undertaken in order to facilitate and 
harmonize cooperation in the European Defence and Security Policy, it is possible to make 
certain conclusions on the progress of armaments cooperation and defence procurement within 
the context of EU legal framework.  
First of all, the conclusion can be drawn from the legal analysis is that despite the common 
perception on  EU’s role in  security-related tasks, there is lack of consensus between the 
member states on key questions of foreign policy, which  in turn is reflected in the limited 
powers of CSDP initiatives and bodies. Alongside, it is apparent the Treaty of Lisbon has not 
changed considerably the way CSDP policy-making process and its implementation are 
executed. The defence-related decisions are still taken unanimously by the Member States. 
Therefore, the ToL still preserves the separation between the former First and Second Pillars.
62
 
Through the examination of institutional innovations and legal developments within European 
defence cooperation framework, it is possible to claim that area of European defence industry 
cooperation is strongly bound to its legal limitations. As the following sections will demonstrate, 
those limitations directly reflect the lack of political will among Member States to generate 
concrete initiatives in order to enhance cooperation under the CSDP framework. As such, the use 
                                                          
61
 Panos Koutrakos. “The Role of Law in Common Security and Defence Policy: Functions, Limitations and 
Perceptions.” 2011. 
62
 Tom Dyson and Theodore Konstadinides. “Understanding the Limitations of the EU’s Common Security and 
Defence Policy.”  Routledge, 2013, pp.8-9. 
34 
 
of CSDP by member states as an effective tool to cope with global threats and as credible means 
to facilitate intergovernmental coordination of defence industries remains rather limited. Thus, 
despite the introduction and adaptation of new defence collaboration initiatives in the EU, in the 
absence of structured coordination of national policies, the European armaments market remains 























4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Since the first initiatives towards the development of more coherent European Defence, 
the EU has undergone a long path towards establishing authoritative legal and political entities 
operating in defence-related areas. There have been over 30 civilian and military missions of 
different nature deployed under the CSDP framework to various locations around the world. 
Moreover, besides the importance of the CSDP’s role within EU foreign policy, it has significant 
impact on encouraging and harmonizing cooperation between the member states towards 
military capability development and defence industry consolidation. Nevertheless, as it was 
outlined in the previous section, European institutions are not exclusive actors in shaping and 
conducting the military policy of the EU. Indeed, nation states have a great impact on the 
defence integration process, as they pursue their own roles, interests and objectives within the 
process.   
Considering that this research seeks to analyse the complexity of interaction among actors within 
European defence structure, to explore the way the member states choose to restructure their 
defence industries in times of austerity and to draw possible implications of those policies on the 
state of defence in EU. It is important to draw a comprehensive theoretical framework which 
would meet the purposes of the paper. Thus, this section will provide a brief outline of the 
selected theoretical approaches towards phenomenon of European defence cooperation and 
integration. 
Importantly, despite on-going theoretical debates over the nature of  the European 
defence integration within the field of International Relations theories and its sub-field of 
European integration theories, it has been noted that scholarship on the CSDP is generally 
‘fragmented in its theoretical inquiry’, and that ‘a loud normative debate dominates in the 
absence of systemic, empirically grounded theoretical inquiry’.
63
 As the phenomenon of 
European defence integration appeared to be largely undertheorised, in 2011 a ‘second wave’ of 
scholarship was called to be focused more on theory building, its expansion and applicability 
rather than on descriptive and normative analyses that has been dominating the field.
64
 This task 
has been warmly welcomed by the academia so a number of newly published studies increased. 
Although debate on CSDP’s features and drivers is highly contested, it is possible to distinguish 
two dominant competitive approaches in the field: constructivism and neorealism. Thus, these 
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two approaches will be examined in more detail considering analysis of the legal and 
institutional framework of European defence integration provided in previous chapters.  
The normative approach towards European Defence integration is indeed substantial. For 
instance, the liberal institutionalist school argues that the aim of the CSDP is to endorse EU’s 
commitment to multilateralism, transnational dialogue and international environment, which are 
the drivers that gave rise to the ESDP as such. Apparently, for the long time the liberal 
institutionalism and constructivism were predominant schools of thought in relation to the CSDP 
and appeared to gain more analytical utility in approaching defence cooperation in Europe after 
the Cold War.  
Furthermore, certain scholars distinguish the importance of the socialization within institutional 
settings, where the CSDP is defined as a group of policy-makers within a ‘social field’, which 
seek to elaborate the rules and features of CSDP structuring and consequently affect the defence 
integration process.
65
 Other scholars emphasize supranational character of European integration 
process with its self-sustaining and reinforcing dynamic. Meaning that, the integration process is 
boosted by the constant spill-over effect from one sector to another.
66
  However, these theories 
have failed to provide insights on a lack of positive developments in defence cooperation.  
  
4.1. CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH 
The core Constructivism’s believe is that socially and institutionally-embedded norms 
characterize identities and, therefore, interests. Hence, from Constructivists point of view, the 
evolution of the CSDP is characterized by the development of a European ‘strategic culture’ and 
progress of ‘Europeanisation’ process within national defence policies.
67
 Whereas normative 
convergence between national strategic cultures has been developing around key security issues 
of the post-Cold War period, instruments to tackle these challenges have evolved. According to 
Howorth, the CSDP represents a ‘new normative approach to the International Relations’ which 
is autonomous from NATO. Going further, he argues that in contrast to NATO policies and 
tools, which include hard power projection and involvement in high-intensity operations on the 
global scale, the European strategic culture compromises various policy instruments with an 
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emphasis on civilian crisis-management and prevention characterized by multilateralism and mix 
of soft and hard power.
68
 Thus, while national strategic cultures retain a high-level of rigidity, 
slowing convergence, Constructivist optimistically perceives the phenomenon of European 
defence cooperation. They believe that states will be able to escape the pervasive effects of 
anarchy through establishing supranational institutions. 
4.1.1. CONCEPT OF SECURITY GOVERNANCE 
Constructivist approach to European defence cooperation is also associated with the 
concept of ‘Security Governance’. It points out the growing tendency of erosion of a national 
state’s role in policy agenda-setting and implementation with reference to a general move from 
government to governance within European security.
69
 Thus, instead of treating the EU security 
system as a product of functional spill-over or intergovernmental bargaining, the governance 
approach sees the shape of the European security structure as an independent variable which 
explains the policies within.
70
  
Existing literature on security governance argues that the traditional state-centric approach 
cannot fully explain current security developments that are taking place within EU. There are 
several assumptions that security governance approach relies on, which are: (I) hierarchy, or the 
existence of multiple centers of power, (II) the interaction of multiple actors, both public and 
private, (III) formal and informal institutionalisation, (IV) relations between actors that are 
ideational in character, and (V) a collective purpose.
71
   
Therefore, followers of security governance approach argue that there is certain degree of 
evolution within European security system from an intergovernmental towards more 
institutionalised. Thus, current European security system is less hierarchical than it used to be. 
Although the second pillar remains the subject to intergovernmental procedures, the security 
environment has changed. There is a greater role of individual agencies, which tend to act in 
more “European” manner, for instance, when it is up to agenda-setting and consolidating a 
common EU security discourse or strategic narrative.
72
 
Going further, within a less hierarchical security order, new actors within and beyond the state 
became more influential. This reflects a certain trend in the development of security system 
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which comprises various processes of fragmentation and separation in the monitoring, delivery 
and coordination. This particularly makes the case in regard to an institution like the EU, where 
the general level of integration is high and interaction between state and non-state actors is 
extensive. Since European security is a cross-pillar issue, there is a necessity for better 
coordination between the different units of the Council and the Commission. However, there is a 
general proliferation of various entities under the Council Secretariat and of institutions such as 
the European Defence Agency, the Counter Terrorism Group (CTG) and various research or 
advisory agencies. As such, ESDP/CSDP represents a highly-networked policy area.
73
  
Thirdly, the EU is an institutionalised entity. So in order to analyse security system of the EU it 
is important to understand the dynamics and the processes of institutionalization process within 
it. There are lots of permanent representatives and seconded personnel are working for the 
ESDP.  Therefore, through interaction and socialisation, they are likely to develop some degree 
of common attitude and collective perception. This can be observed through prism of the 




Fourthly, the ideational dimension of the EU is one of importance for security governance 
approach. Indeed, any claims to Europeanisation process should comprise claims on some shared 
norms and ideas. In area of ESDP/CSDP collective action is largely dependent upon a 
consistency of views why, how and when to act commonly. To the extent that the EU appears to 
act in accordance with a “logic of appropriateness” rather than a “logic of consequences”, 




The last but not least, a collective purpose is the less convenient description of the environment 
in which CSDP has evolved. European security architecture has been developed in rather 
arbitrary and opportunistic way. Nevertheless, the governance approach specifies that some 
policy outcomes can be obtained under some circumstances, but the likelihood of diversion 
remains high due to the complexity of various processes within policy-making and governance. 
In other words, the actors within a governance system initially may pursue collective objectives 
but as the system depends on competing preferences, under these patterns of influence the 
system evolves over time, so the outcome may be different from what was expected. However, 
                                                          
73
 Per M. Norheim-Martinsen. “Beyond Intergovernmentalism:  the Governance Approach to the European 
Security and Defence Policy.” University of Latvia, Riga, 25-27 September 2008, pp. 5-6. 
74
 Mark Webber, Stuart Croft, Terry Terriff and Elke Krahman, ‘The Governance of European Security’, Review of 
International Studies, vol. 30, no. 1, January 2004. 
75
 For more on Europeanisation concept see e.g. Manners and Whitman 2000; Olsen 2002.  
39 
 
there is belief among security governance scholars that eventually the momentum and unity of 
the whole process should grow stronger. Thus, the totality of the first four features of security 
governance comes together in a fifth one, which describes the overall process of how a system of 
governance is likely to evolve in the future.
76
  
To conclude, main arguments of the Constructivist approach lay within assumption that 
institutional structures has been established above the nation-state and while the nature of 
European defence integration becomes increasingly multi-level, a gradual ‘socialisation’ and 
‘policy-learning’ tendencies emerges. This in turn accelerates processes of normative 
convergence at the national level and increases the willingness of states to allocate more 
competencies to the supranational level.
77
 Therefore, even if national governments preserve a 
high-level of rigidity, which interrupts with normative convergence, Constructivists remain quite 
optimistic over the development of integrated European Defence Market where the member 
states will overcome the effects of anarchy with establishment of supranational institutions. 
Particularly, Webber et al argue that: ‘The involvement…of hierarchical power centres, multiple 
actors, new institutions and ideational exchanges has generated a powerful and purposeful 
momentum in favor of ESDP…The Europeanisation of security has been the great political 
revolution of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century’.
78
 
However, the funding of the previous sections suggests that there are certain limitations that 
member states face on the path from the sovereign to the functional in European defence system. 
Indeed, Constructivist interpretations of drivers and potential destinations of European defence is 
challenged by Neorealist scholars, who argue that CSDP’s emergence and evolution is 
determined by the adherence of the member states to the powerful material forces of the balance 
of power.
79
  Although these forces has led to further development of the convergence in terms of 
defence and security policy objectives and instruments, such as military structures, doctrine and 
capabilities, however,  they still entail challenges within the scope of cooperation in European 
defence. Frankly, the Constructivist studies on CSDP are dismissive of the theoretical insights 
has been provided by Neorealism. 
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4.2. NEOREALIST APPROACH 
Neorealism describes nature of the international system as one of uncertainty, anarchy 
and competition, in which unknowns of other states’ intentions force states to adopt offensive 
strategies in order to maximise their security.
80
 Although, the international system is not always 
postulates the state of the ‘pure war’, there is always a risk that security competition will lead to 
a war due the anarchic nature of international relations. Therefore, core element of Neorealist 
argumentation is that the drivers of conflict are not primarily determined by the domestic 
character of individual states or regimes, but by the structure and dynamics of the international 
system these actors are part of.
81
  
Nevertheless, the state is the most important actor in dynamics of international politics.
82
 States, 
especially the great powers, determine and establish the context and the rules for other actors, 
including international organizations such as the European Union. Going further, Neorealists 
assume that in anarchic nature of international politics states remain rational and functionally 
similar actors. Functional similarity means that all states and especially great powers seek to 
maintain a balance of capabilities across the three main dimensions of power: military power, 
economic power and power over opinion.
83
  
In turn, the dynamic and the nature of the international system generate security competition 
across the states, where actors should rely on their own resource, or on resources of the allies. 
While the level of the completion can vary under the structural distribution of power within the 
international system, the cooperation remains difficult and is based primarily on self-interest 
calculations. Furthermore, in order to assure their own survival states seek to maximize their 
relative power in regards to other actors.
84
 That means that states’ focus on relative gains limits 
the probability of cooperation. As states are concerned about their position in the international 
system in relation to their main rivals and potential enemies, therefore, they are likely to engage 
in a cooperation only if they benefit as much or more than their peer equivalents.
85
 
While concept of power is of the great importance in the international system dynamics, Hyde-
Price analyses four typologies of power configuration: unipolarity; bipolarity; balanced 
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multipolarity, and unbalanced multipolarity.
86
 Unipolarity is characterised by the economic and 
military dominance of a single great power which has no other equivalent competitors. An actor 
empowered by their geopolitical dominance and relative power advantage tends to behave in 
capricious, arbitrary and unpredictable ways. This suggests unipolar system to be unstable and 
unpredictable.
87
 The second power configuration – bipolarity – is characterized by the 
dominance of two great powers, whose power capabilities are greater than those of others. 
Bipolarity is usually assumed to be more stable form of power distribution.
88
 Balanced 
multipolarity configuration lies within the international system, where three or more states enjoy 
relatively similar material power, but none of them has the potential to achieve regional 
hegemony. Hence, states tend to favor security maximisation over power maximisation, so the 
cooperation among great powers is likely to occur. In contrast, unbalanced multipolarity, where 
one of the system’s great powers has greater power resources so it has the potential to achieve 




Following Hyde-Price‘s study on  the European Security dynamics, it is possible to claim that 
Post-Cold War Europe suited within a unipolar international system in which the US is a 
regional hegemon, which is able to act unilaterally and coercively as offensive unipolarity 
suggests.
90
 At the same time, Europe is subject to regional ‘balanced multipolarity’ due to the 
power balance between European major military powers (i.e. Germany, France and the U.K.) 
and the fact that currently none of them can make a credible bid for a regional hegemony. 
Importantly, as balance multipolarity is charactirised by smaller degree of competition than in 
other types of power formation, the development of cooperation between the states in order to 
address shared security concerns and collectively shape the regional security is likely to occur.
91
  
From this perspective, European states have two possible ways to respond to unipolarity. First of 
all, it is to ‘balance’ the state of greater capability by comprehensive re-armament and formation 
of a strong military alliance. As neorealists argue, the CSDP is an example of ‘soft balancing’ 
against the U.S. This strategy involves the use of non-military tools to frustrate unilateral action 
by the hegemon and sets out the ground for a more explicit military alliance to develop. From the 
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other hand, there is different approach, so-called ‘bandwagoing’ on US power, in which 
European states choose to cooperate on the side with the stronger power for ‘opportunistic gain’. 
Taking into account empirical findings, it is possible to argue that EU member states’ choice to 
develop defence cooperation through NATO and CSDP forms a key pillar for a process of 
‘reformed’ bandwagoning on US power.
92
 (Schweller, 1994: 81-82). Furthermore, due to 
growing concerns among member states on various scenarios when the U.S. might choose not to 
involve in the conflict, the second key pillar of European ‘reformed’ bandwagoning has emerged 
through the Battlegroup Initiatives and calls for further militarization of the CSDP.
93
  
However, the solidarity of European states around a process of ‘reformed’ bandwagoning on US 
power is not without contestation. Indeed, taking into account the development of CSDP and 
NATO with similar instruments competing over similar objectives, it is possible to claim the 
emergence of regional security competition. However, efforts have been taken during recent 
years to facilitate cooperation in force planning command and strategic coherence between 
CSDP and NATO.
94
 Yet these arrangements have faltered due to differences between France and 
the UK vision of NATO and the EU in the structure of European security.  
Along with theoretical insights that Neorealism provides the explanation of drivers and dynamics 
within process of European defence cooperation, the theory also provides tools for the further 
analysis of the highly-intergovernmental nature of European Defence. Due to the uncertainty on 
other states’ intentions and taking into account anarchical nature of international politics, 
European states fear the risk of abandonment by the U.S. or other European alliance partners. 
Therefore, EU member states are trapped in ‘alliance security dilemma’. Developed by Glenn 
Snyder, this concept posits that the scope and depth of cooperation within alliances and other 
forms of cross-national defence collaboration is limited by the fear of abandonment or 
entrapment by other participants.
95
 Furthermore, Snyder highlights, an abandonment refers not 
only to full defection from an Alliance but also to the following set of probabilities: ‘the ally may 
realign with the opponent; he may merely de-align, abrogating the alliance contract; he may fail 
to make good on his specific commitments, or he may fail to provide support in contingencies 
where his support is expected’.
96
Therefore, European states cannot be sure that their respective 
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partners will fulfill their obligations and promises. Consequently, states are highly concerned 
with potential threat of losses in relative power as a consequence of defection and remain highly-
cautious about passing sovereignty in defence up. Therefore, Neorealist scholars argue that in 
EU a shift toward integration in defence policy is not likely to occur as well as the pooling and 
sharing of capabilities and forces will be limited. 
To conclude, taking into account empirical findings on the development of European 
defence cooperation in terms of institutional formation and legal background, the Neorealist 
approach provides an effective theoretical foundation for the analysis of the state European 
defence cooperation. Indeed, as it was deliberated in the previous chapter the institutional 
instruments of European defence are non-binding: the EDA had a little power and less success 
initiatives, the applicability of the Code of Conduct was up to the will of the states, and the 
national protectionism prevailed in matters of high politics.  Although, Constructivist school 
grasps the importance of normative aspects within the context of EU defence cooperation, 
Neorealist approach provides a more precise explanation of the intergovernmental nature of 
cooperation in defence, therefore it has been selected as main theoretical approach towards 
















Since the end of the Cold War, France has faced the challenge of restructuring and 
streamlining its defence industrial base in response to declining defence funding and export 
sales, while retaining its core design and producing capabilities. In an effort to manage the 
transition from the Cold War legacy of arms production and to lower its negative effects on 
employment and economy, the General Delegation for Armament (DGA) has been pursuing an 
active defense-industrial policy focused around two aspects. The first policy seeks to preserve 
and promote the technological competencies of the defense industry. Thus, the DGA proceed to 
regroup French national arsenals into state-owned companies, pushing defense companies to 
involve into the civil sector more, investing in defense R&D at the expense of current 
production, encouraging defence contractors to concentrate on certain areas of the best 
performance in order to improve their competitiveness, and promoting greater reliance on dual-
use products. The second policy sought to enable French defense companies to play a leading 
role in the restructuring of DTIB on the European scale. This objective has being pursued 
through collaborative research and development programmes, strategic alliances, acquisitions of 
foreign firms, and cross-border mergers.
97
 
For instance, In October 1997, the French government announced that it would privatize 
Thomson-CSF, and bring Dassault Electronique, the space and defense electronics businesses of 
Alcatel, and the satellite businesses of Aérospatiale within the company. Thomson-CSF acquired 
Racal Electronics of the UK in June 2000 and was renamed Thales. The company now is leading 
on technology development for Europe’s helicopter business.
98
 Moreover, decreased demand and 
shrinking defence budget led to the consolidation of French and other European companies 
across the boundaries – notably EADS, MBDA and SAFRAN Group.
99
 The reshaping of the 
national DTIB had several consequences. For instance, increasing privatization of  defence 
contractors has led to concentration of production over larger French companies with greater 
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5.1. STATE POSITIONING IN DEFENCE INDUSTRY 
Table 3: France State positioning towards the defence industry 
Socio-economic environment - Orginised industries around ‘national champions’ 
- Weight of the state in the National Innovation 
System, strong importance of DTIB 
Political context - Strategic autonomy and independence 
State position as custumer - State as a shareholder 
- Centralisation at the DGA 
Consequences for DTIB - DTIB focus and prioritize  national champions 
 Source: Lember 2014 
Historically, France’s approach to national security was channeled through prioritization 
of national independence and strategic autonomy.
100
 Within the framework of deterrence the 
national DTIB has a crucial influence on the innovation system. Thus, without the state’s 
involvement, defence market alone cannot ensure development and delivery of advanced 
technologies and equipment required by national security policies. 
101
  
Despite revision of the national procurement programme in 1990s, DGA save it position as a 
strong influencer in the process and trajectory of defence capabilities development, through its 
involvement into major arms acquisition programs.  Throughout the wave of privatization, 
France was able to maintain its stakes in the national defence companies while seeking industrial 
partners rather than institutional investors.
102
 The French state adopted the approach to the 
defence sector promoting the arms exports while relying on national preferences for public 
procurement. (See table 3) 
5.1. DEFENCE SPENDING TRENDS 
During last decade French defense spending has fared well in comparison to many EU 
member states. France has been able to maintain a rather ambitious defense agenda, preserving 
its independent nuclear deterrence, professionalizing and rationalizing its military and 
modernising its defence equipment while deploying its troops in variety of conflicts overseas. 
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Nevertheless, the overall economic situation in France is deplorable, as the debt rate increased 
dramatically over last decade, from 68.2% in 2008 up to 96% in 2016 to GDP.
103
 The French 
government has aimed to cut public spending by 50 billion euros during over last three years, 
partially by freezing a range of welfare benefits and wage of most public sector workers. Thus, it 
intends to bring its deficit below the European Union's ceiling of three percent of GDP. In light 
of the economic and budgetary crisis, a revised defence spending law for the period 2011-2013 
was presented in late September 2010.
104
 From then on, the total defence spending for stated 
period would amount to €91.6bn, instead of €95.3bn that was initially planned in the 2009-2014 
Military Programming Law (MPL).
105
 
Moreover, it was expected from French defence sector to accumulate of about €3.5 bn. in 
savings over three year period. Given an annual defense budget of about €32 billion (about 40 bl. 
including pensions), the cuts has been not as brutal as those initially introduced in Germany. 
However, the defence retrenchment programme proved to be challenging.   
The first cost-saving measures comprise shutting down a significant number of military bases 
and installations, both at home and abroad. France’s military presence in Africa, in particular, 
has to be downgraded significantly. Thereof, the defence budget has been expected to benefit 
from €2.4bn due to the selling of real estate and military radio frequencies in 2010. However, 
French MoD has had only partial success in doing so to date.
106
  So far the greatest revenue from 
selling military assets was in 2011, which brought exceptional 1.1 billion euros. The military 
radio frequencies that would bring about €850m have yet to find buyers.
107
 
Furthermore, cuts in defence budget have forced the French military to streamline its armed 
forces and pursue a strategy of moving toward a medium-weight force suitable for the broad 
array of contingencies. Nevertheless, France has been striving to maintain its commitment to full 
spectrum of operations; autonomous action; and multiple, sustained operations. There are 
multiple reasons for this. The first is that the budget cuts have been light, at least in comparison 
to those faced by the British and German MoDs. The budget has, in effect, grown slightly or 
remained flat since 2009. For instance, the 2011 budget was €31.2 billion and the 2013 budget 
                                                          
103
 INSEE DATABASE, FRANCE 
104
 French Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Defense budget guidelines for 2011-2013, Paris, July 7, 2010. 
http://ambafrance-us.org/spip.php?article1751  
105
 French Ministry of Defence, Projet de loi relatif à la programmation militaire pour les années 2009 à 2014 et 
portant diverses dispositions concernant la défense [Draft military planning law 2009–2014 and diverse defence 
measures], 2008. 
106
 Véronique Guillermard, Cécile Crouzel. “Budget de la Défense: la recherché preserve.” [Defence Budget: to 
preserve desired], Le Figaro, 8 January 2011. 
107
 Louis Gautier, ‘Budget de la defense: tour d’écrou et escamotage,’[Defence Budget: Round of retraction], Les 
Echos, 1 December 2010. 
47 
 
was set to be €31.4 billion (both without pensions), despite the fact that earlier the Defense 
Ministry has been asked to lower its budget by seven percent in 2013, and by four precent in 
both, 2014 and 2015 budgets. 
France now disposes of two resources to set the agenda for its defence and strategic policy in up-
coming years: a White Paper on Defence (published on April 29, 2013)
108
 and programme Loi de 
programmation militaire
109
 (LPM 2014-2019) concerning military spending and budgetary 
provisions for the period of 2014-2019. Although constant debates among French political elite 
on future destination of the French military in the light of economic stagnation, the 2013 White 
Paper was not a major break from its 2008 predecessor. Nevertheless, the document calls for 
further reduction in forces, argues for resizing the geographic region in which French military 
interventions would be legitimate, and indicates that military resources will be redistributed 
according to the readiness and operational requirements of particular military units. 
The White paper set out the defense budget of $235 billion between 2014 and 2019. The 
equipment budget is foreseen at about $21 billion per year, which is down from $24 billion that 
was initially suggested in 2008, but still reasonable for the 4,000 or so defense-related 
enterprises in France, which employ about 165,000 people.
110
 
French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian presented France's six-year defence funding 
programme, the LPM2014-2019, on 2 August 2013. The LPM sets out defence spending to 
remain flat in nominal terms from 2013 to 2016 at EUR31.38 billion a year, rising slightly to 
EUR31.56 billion in 2017, EUR31.78 billion in 2018 and EUR32.51 billion in 2019.
111
 
However, the HIS Jane’s analysis indicated that the 2017 budget will be at EUR32.44 billion, a 
1.8% increase over 2016. With the latest revisions of the French defence budget, with the new 
2017 figures about EUR1.1 billion higher than was set by the 2014-2019 Military Programming 
Law (LPM) and EUR775 million higher than the revised LPM of July 2015. With EUR8.15 
billion in spending on military pensions incorporated French defence spending will total 
EUR40.84 billion in 2017, or 1.77% of gross domestic product.
112
(See figure 7) 
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Figure 7: French Annual Defence Budgets, 2015-2019* 
 
*In the red is the amount expected from real estate disposals; the top line is the additional funds to the 
budget approved in 2015. Source: French MoD graphic 
But numbers do not show the full picture of challenges France and EU’s major military 
powers have been facing.  As military operations today require a precise military savoir-faire, 
well-trained armed forces, reliable intelligence capacities, and adequate equipment, it is 
important to analyse the scope of reductions in France’s defence capabilities. Although, today’s 
military requirements are accounted for recent military provisions – in 2014, for example, the 
intelligence budget will benefit from an increase of 39 million euros (not including wages), and 
an additional 500 million euros will be allocated to  troop equipment, weapons maintenance, 
training, and research and development. Nevertheless, it is important to note that there is already 
a gap of approximately €45 billion between the past defence funding programmes and resulting 
budgets. Therefore, taking into account growing budgetary crisis in France, it is highly 
disputable whether the 2013 white paper is a realistic assessment of French military capabilities 




5.2. ARMED FORCES: STRUCTURAL REFORMS  
In the post-Cold War period, France along with other major Western powers has been 
reforming its armed forces to cope with the new threats to security. Therefore, in 1994, a 
government white paper was set out to create a plan for the military that was focused on dealing 
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with various threats of instability around the globe, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and the appearance of new asymmetric threats. In order to maintain strategic 
relevance, a new model of armed forces was introduced. The so-called ‘Model 2015’ was to be 
“a professional, more compact army, better equipped, better adapted to actions outside the 
national territory. Its capacities were defined so as to allow, simultaneously, the development of 
permanent arrangement of prevention, a visible and significant presence in an international 
coalition, as well as more limited operations under national command, while providing the 
protection of the territory and its approaches.”
114
 Therefore, in 1995 under the Jacques Chirac 
presidency it was decided to end conscription and transform the army into an all-professional 
armed force. From then on the French army has undergone fundamental transformation both in 
terms of capabilities and size.  
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ annual Military Balance, France’s 
active duty forces in 1997 comprised of 358,800 shranked to 259,050 in 2002.
 115
  In 2015, 
French active-duty personnel accounts for 202,964.
116
 By 2020, the expectation is that the 
military’s active-duty numbers will decline even further, dropping to approximately 190,000.
117
 
According to the white paper 2013, in up-coming years France is compelled to cut nearly 24,000 
military personnel from the current staff of the MoD, including troops and civilians in addition to 
the 54,000 announced in the last white paper in 2008. Thus, by 2019 the French Ministry of 
Defence is expected to meet an overall strength of 240 000 people (180 000 military and 60 000 
civilians). Furthermore, the white paper seeks for a reorganization of the armed forces on the 
basis of “the principle of differentiation.” Although there were no exact description the way this 
principle to be implemented, it is described as “giving priority to the equipment and training” of 
some elements of the armed forces versus others.
118
 In other words, it appears that there will be a 
two-tiered structure of the armed forces: one well-equipped and trained to contribute to military 
operations overseas, and the other to be formed primarily for domestic tasks not requiring such 
costly equipment and/or training. Although this approach appears to be justified in terms of 
budget savings, in future it may bring certain problems within ‘domestic’ armed forces 
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Furthermore, the French Chief of the Army Staff, General Bernard Ract-Radoux, pointed out the 
negative impact the reduction of training periods have on armed forces: “[T]he Army is 
insufficiently funded to completely undertake an operational preparation of quality”.
120
 Due to 
the budgetary constraints, the mandatory preparation period was previously reduced from 150 to 
120 days; meanwhile the average operational preparation period among the armed forces was 
only around 111 days in 2012. This led General Ract-Madoux to say that “the Army is now 
under a critical threshold which endangers the operational preparation, the success of the mission 
and then our soldiers’ life.”
121
 Taking into account that weapon systems are becoming more 
complex and require even more qualification to handle them, the shortage in training is 
becoming a critical issue and may have negative consequences on the effectiveness of French 
forces on the battlefield. Additionally, the ‘operational contract’ of the French forces has to be 
reduced in up-coming decade.  
The French army is one of the largest armies in Europe with capacity of 106,000 soldiers in 81 
specialized regiments. It is also one of the best equipped with VBCIs, an integrated infantry 
combat system (FELIN), self-propelled howitzers (CAESER), and attack helicopters (Tiger). 
However, as it was outlined previously, there is probability this advanced equipment will not be 
used to its best due to the lack of sustained training among personnel.  
Furthermore, the 2013 white paper also suggests a reduction in rapid deployment forces from the 
2008 white paper’s goal of 30,000to between 15,000 and 20,000. Additionally, the new military 
programme emphasizes the ability to deploy up to 7,000 troops in three concurrent missions. 
Furthermore, the recent experience in Mali, and above all in Afghanistan, has shown that large 
number of multirole helicopters at command is of great importance to cope with missions’ needs. 
Thus, the one of the 2013 white paper’s goals is to equip the army with 140 reconnaissance and 
attack helicopters, 115 tactical helicopters, and 30 tactical drones.
122
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In the course of the resource reconsolidation by the French MoD, since 2008 navy personnel 
have been reduced by 11,000 to 35411 servicemen in 2015
123
. Meanwhile nineteen ships were 
taking out of the exploitation, only four new ships were purchased by 2012. Nevertheless, in 
2013 the French navy has received the highest funding for equipment of 4.37EUR bn. It was 
planned to replace six Rubis-class, nuclear-powered attack submarines with the latest generation 
of Barracuda-class submarines, however, the only one submarine been under construction by 
2013.
124
 Additionally, the White Paper addresses the number of existing shortfalls in the fleet’s 
capabilities through the acquisition of “15 first-class frigates, about 15 patrol vessels and six 
surveillance frigates, as well as maritime patrol aircraft and a mine warfare capability sufficient 
to protect our approaches and projection in expeditionary operations.”
125
 However, taking into 
account budgetary pressures the French MoD is facing currently, there is possibility that orders 
for the FREMM frigates may be cut back. France has already reduced its orders from 18 in 2005 
to 11 in 2008. In June 2013, report said the final number may be as low as 8.
126
 
The French air force has been a subject to budget cuts as well. France’s air fleet was cut by 30 
percent, six fighter squadrons were taking out of service, and twelve domestic and overseas air 
bases were shut down. However, the 2013 white paper stated that the air force is to be reduced 
further. As it was stated in the paper the air fleet to consist of 225 aircrafts instead of the 300 
initially planned in 2008. This means the orders for the Rafale multirole fighter to be reduced. In 
addition, the French air force will be downsizing the number of aircrafts available for major 
operations from 70 to just 45.
127
 
Importantly, the air force is probably the most problematic branch of French military power. As 
the French air fleet lacks long-distance strategic airlift, it challenges France’s ability to act 
independently in course of the military operations abroad. Due to delays in delivery of Airbus 
A400Ms, France has to relay on available 54 C-130 Hercules and Transall aircraft, which are 
outdated and expensive to maintain. Further, the eight CASA/IPTN CN-235s purchased in order 
to fill the capability gap did not meet the missions’ needs, as it was in the 2013 operation in Mali 
when France has to rely on air logistic support of its allies.
128
 Second, as military operations in 
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Mali and Libya revealed there is a major gap in French air force’s capabilities concerns tanker 
aircraft. In order to overcome this obstacle, France has ordered A330 MRTT, which should to 
replace the aging fleet of French tankers. However, the first delivery of the aircraft is not 
expected until 2017 at the earliest. Furthermore, despite that initially it was planned to acquire 14 
planes, in 2013 the number has dropped to 12 tankers.
129
 
In regards to the strategic forces, nuclear deterrence remains the core aspect of French defense 
policy. France’s nuclear forces comprise four ballistic missile–carrying submarines and a 
squadron of fighter bombers carrying cruise missiles. Ten percent of the overall defense budget 
and 20 percent of R&D funds were allocated to maintain these forces in 2016, which amount to 
3.6 EUR billions.  
5.3. DEFENCE EQUIPMENT AND PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
Through the analysis of current features of the structure and equipment of France’s army 
provided in the previous section, it is possible to argue that the 2013 white paper emphasizes 
France’s strategic autonomy and calls for various investments to support France’s capacity to act 
unilaterally. Therefore, the white paper confirms Paris’ determination to fill capability gaps in 
such areas as air transport as well as it seeks to modernize and re-equip every branch of the 
France’s armed forces.  
Importantly, in France the defense budget is perceived differently than other elements of public 
spending. French defense producers are seen as a one of the key pillars of French industry; they 
provide high-skilled jobs and generate technological innovations. According to the General 
Directorate for Armament (DGA), the defense industry also contributes significantly to France’s 
balance of trade:  nearly €15 billion in revenue comes from defense-related exports.
130
 
Therefore, to rationalize budget spending but to support France’s defense industrial base in the 
same time, Hollande has decided to continue procurement of most major weapons systems. 
However, certain contracts were renegotiated in the way of either buying fewer units or delaying 
deliveries and payments. Defense companies were compensated for the renegotiation of the 
contracts with the amount of €45.2 billion.
131
 However, while the French army remains one of 
the best-equipped militaries around the globe in terms of the systems themselves, there is rising 
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uncertainty whether they will be fielded in operationally relevant numbers.
132
 Additionally, 
postponements in equipment delivery obligate French military to rely on outdated equipment 
with significantly higher maintenance costs that initially are not planned under the military bill. 
In other words, the growing number of postponements in capital delivery leads to structural 
disarmament where the armed forces would be supplied with old equipment and in numbers 
which are not sufficient under operational requirements.
133
 In regards to the French defence 
procurement plans, it was translated into following revisions. (See table 4) 
Table 4: Revisions to Equipment Initially Planned between 2009 and 2014 
Equipment Military Spending 
Bill 2009-2014 
Revision Difference  
FELIN (future infantry soldier 
system) 
22,230 17,884 -4,346 
Caesar (fire support) 69 67 -2 
PPT (logistical transport vehicles) 500 287 -213 
NH90-TTH helicopter 23 22 -1 
Rafale combat aircraft 50 66 +16 
Mirage 2000D combat aircraft 5 - -5 
A400 M (tactical transport aircraft) 18 8 -10 
Source: French Senat. Rapport general commission des finances , No. 107, p.39, 2012. 
 
5.4. DEFENCE INDUSTRY – THE SUPPLY SIDE 
Although France economy has been under budgetary pressures in last decades, French 
defence industry is booming. French arms manufacturers have confirmed €6.3 billion in orders to 
foreign countries in 2013, which represents a 31 percent increase in comparison to 2012.The 
figures released by the Ministry of Defence ensure France keeps its spot at number four among 
the world’s largest providers of weapons.
134
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The top seven constructors in France are: Safran (producing navigation systems, optronics, 
software for submarines, ships, aircraft and soldiers), Thales (producer of radars, secure 
communications, drones, electronic missile systems) , Dassault  Aviation (aircraft maker of the 
Rafale and Mirage fighter jets.) , EADS (co-manufacturer of MBDA missile systems, NH90 
helicopters for troop transfer and Tiger combat helicopters, Airbus A400M military transport 
planes, Harfang drones, Astrium anti-missile defense system), NEXTER (supplier of leclerc 
tanks, VBCI armored vehicles, Caesar wheeled self-propelled guns, Aravis tanks, munitions), 
DCNIS ( producing conventional and nuclear powered submarines, Fremm frigates, Mistral 
aircraft carrier) and MBDA ( manufacturer of Meteor air-to-air missiles, Storm shadow/Scalp 
cruise missile, Aster missile-based air defense capability, Milan anti-tank missile).
135
 
Importantly, French government retains a significant degree of political intervention in the 
defence industry. As the arm industry is of the vital strategic importance, France has controlling 
stakes in many leading arm producing firms. For instance, the state controls 26.6 per cent of 
stake in Thales, which is the second largest defence contractor in France. Furthermore, France 
exercises considerable control and political influence over the pan-European defence concern 
European Aeronautics, Defence and Space owning 15 percent of it.
136
 (See Table 5) 
Table 5: Capital Structure of defence companies in France 
 Public Private Number of 
shareholders 
Major Investor Shares 
Owned 
Dassault Aviation 3.1% 96.9% 3 Groupe Industriel 
Marcel Dassault 
50% 
DCNS 64% 36% 3 French State 64% 
Nexter 100%  1 French State 100% 
Saffron 22.4% 77.6% 4 French State 22.4% 
Thales 26.6% 64.4% - French State 26.6% 
Source: Matelly (2016) 
In the time of austerity, DGA has aimed to restructure certain elements of France’s 
defence industry, however the results were mixed. For example, it tried to oblige Sagem and 
Thales to merge their opsonic assets, as the market’s demand is limited for two companies. Even 
though the French government is a shareholder of both companies, Sagem and Thales have not 
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submitted to the requirements of the French state so far. In terms of army equipment, some 
changes have been introduced to the industrial landscape, most notably with the recent merger of 
land vehicles specialists Panhard with Renault Trucks Defence. This reduced the number of 
French companies specializing in military vehicles to two with Nexter included.
137
  
The 2013 White Paper underlines the fact that France sees the European military-technological 
and industrial base as a means to forwarding its own national military-industrial interests. 
Therefore, at the European level, the Franco-British initiative aims to develop the collaboration 
between France and the UK in the missile domain. Both nations are moving forward with the 
development of a new helicopter-launched anti-shipping missile in the guise of the Future Air-
Surface Guided Weapon-Heavy (FASGW-Heavy) which is expected to be ready for use by the 
Royal Navy and the Marine Nationale (French Navy) after 2015. Paris and London also agreed 
to cooperate on the next generation of nuclear submarines, mine countermeasures and Satellite 
Communication. All these co-operation items could lead to greater industrial consolidation. 
However, this is not stated as core political goal, except for missiles, where the objective is to 
have further consolidation within the Franco-British-German-Italian company MBDA.
138
 
At the domestic level, French land armaments companies dependent on the Scorpion, VBMR 
(Véhicule Blinde Multi-Role/ ‘Multi-Role Armoured Vehicle’) and EBRC (Engin Blindé 
Reconnaissance et Combat/ ‘Armoured Combat and Reconnaissance Platform’) programmes for 
domestic orders. The Scorpion initiative is transformational programme towards French Army 
with objective to improve weaponry, land force connectivity and force mobility .Furthermore, 
the VBMR and EBRC projects on producing armoured vehicles that started in 2016. In terms of 
military aviation sector, the development of new military aviation programmes by the 
governments is important for Dassault Aviation. Presently, the company builds eleven Rafales 
per year for its French customer. Meanwhile, French naval shipbuilding is dominated by DCN. 
The company has been leading three important national programmes in producing the Franco-
Italian ‘Horizon’ class air defence destroyer, the ‘Acquitaine’ class FREMM (Fregate Multi-
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5.5. DEFENCE COOPERATION AND POOLING AND SHARING OPTIONS 
In light of budgetary constraints of France’s military and in order to project its strategic 
ambitions, French government has become more pragmatic in its defence cooperation 
arrangements and has sought to benefit in terms of military and material capabilities rather than 
mere political agreements. Consequently, despite the vocal support for development of the EU’s 
military capacity, France is not likely to push it at all costs and is increasingly reluctant to invest 
in CSDP.  At the same time, NATO is not considered to be desired security cooperation 
framework as it challenges French strategic culture and interest to be perceived as a distinctive 
security actor, having its own, rather than NATO-dependent strategic prospects. Despite the 
above, the EU’s pooling and sharing and NATO’s smart defence initiatives remain important to 
France, which seeks economic, military and operational benefits from collaboration in various 
projects, such as helicopter training programs or by pooling maritime patrol aircraft.  
The strategic and economic motives for France to sign the 2010 Franco-British Lancaster House 
agreement are those of collaborating with the state of similar strategic culture and sharing the 
costs of capabilities development. Furthermore, as U.K. proved to be a reliable partner in robust 
military operations as well as in delivery of necessary capabilities, it is more likely to remain 
France’s key partner. Among other arrangements, in November 2010 France and U.K. agreed to 
cooperate in nuclear testing and to pool logistics and training capacity for the A400M.
140
 
Moreover, France will use UK air-tanker capabilities as well as a research and technology 
cooperation will be continued with a joint annual budget of €100m.
141
 
Apart from the UK, France has hard time finding possible European partnerships from which it 
might benefit. An exception might be Germany, but as it was outlined above, it is rather 
challenging for states to establish trustful partnership due to their different strategic cultures and 
interests.  
Under financial pressures France has to seek collaboration in specific capability development 
and industrial projects. France already considers Poland to be among such potential partners. 
However, the prospects for closer Franco-Polish defence cooperation are mixed. On the political 
level, both countries can facilitate cooperation through already existing on the Weimar and 
“Weimar plus” formats and pursue the concept of a more robust CSDP. In regards to military 
cooperation, Poland and France may establish bilateral collaboration in different forms of joint 
training programme for personnel. However, France’s priority to secure its own political and 
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military capacity impedes negotiations on possible prospects for pooling and sharing. It is 
currently unacceptable to the French government to rely on the military capabilities of other state 




5.6. APPROACH TO CSDP 
Of all the EU member states, France has arguably been the strongest proponent of a 
robust European defence policy by leading and promoting the development of EU’s capacity for 
rapid and robust action on international level. France has played a key role in the establishment 
of the CSDP and has been prominent supporter for development and empowerment of the EU 
defence-related institutions and initiatives. However, recently, the general feeling among French 
policy-makers is one of disappointment with the EU member states. There have been plenty of 
times, was it Libya, Syria or recently Mali, when French called for decisive action have gone in 
vain. Therefore, due to the failure in collective response to crisis overseas along with poor 
development of military capabilities across Europe, France has become frustrated of CSDP.  This 
makes a case especially in regard to German’s perception on the role of CSDP and general 
reluctance of the federation to use hard power means. 
In order to compensate for the loss of great power status over last century, France has been 
inspired by the European project that would transfer its national ambitions to the European level. 
From the initial stage of the European integration process, France perceived the robust military, 
political and economic cooperation of European states as one of the appropriate means to 
balance the U.S. as well as to act independently from NATO.  
Furthermore, France’s recent strategic documents addressed the importance of European 
integration. As it is described in the 2008 White Paper: “France wants to be in the front rank of 
this drive for progressive political unification… (and) will work for a more unified, stronger 
European Union, with a greater presence in the fields of security and defence”.
143
 Along others, 
main objectives that France has in regard to the CSDP includes developing of intervention 
capacity to conduct two or three peacekeeping missions and boosting cooperation across every 
spectrum of defence capabilities, mainly through pooling and sharing programmes.
144
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However, this enthusiasm in the paper does not reflect the state of European defence integration 
in reality. The EU member states have proven to be unable or unwilling to engage in robust and 
complex military activities in the wider European neighborhood. The economic crisis in Europe 
has further contributed to states’ reluctance to contribute and invest in CSDP. 
As France has been becoming more and more frustrated with other member states’ attitude of 
rising indifference and reluctance, France has moved to the practice of bilateral cooperation with 
U.K and the U.S. Particularly, taking into account France’s area of strategic priority, so called 
‘arc of crisis’, in  North Africa, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and the Persian Gulf, not only 
cooperation with U.K and the U.S. provide more flexibility for France’s action, but strategic 
interests and cultures of these partners make them more willing and able to cope with crisis in 
proactive and robust manner.
145
  
For instance, in the time of EU’s failure to respond to the crisis in Libya, Britain and France led 
the coalition of the willing under the NATO framework with additional support from U.S. side. 
Meanwhile, during the recent crisis in Mali, France decided to launch counter-insurgency 
campaign outside the framework of the CSDP with military support of U.K. and U.S.A. The 
situation with the EU member states’ disengagement was especially problematic during crisis in 
Syria, when German decided not to involve. As well as EUFOR Tchad mission under CSDP 
framework was not as smooth as it could be, as one more time the EU member states failed to 
deliver required funding and military capabilities.
146
 
 After all it is not surprising that France’s 2013 White Paper on Defence is less optimistic about 
European defence cooperation. It contains a comprehensive list of the shortfalls of CSDP 
including differences in objectives within the common defence, different strategic cultures, and 
different interests. The paper also addresses the inability of Europe to integrate: “Europe does 
not yet seem willing to assume a greater responsibility in securing the European continent and 
the world, despite the encouragement of the US. On the contrary, many European states fall 
below the bar of a defence spending of 1% of GDP”.
147
 Thus, it is possible to argue that French 
government is clearly skeptical about the capacity of Europe to integrate and to put defence 
matters as a priority. 
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The French military has been less affected by defence budget cuts in comparison to the 
U.K. This has enabled it to move forward modernization while restructuring its military forces. 
The French military have been cutting support and logistical units, which might affect the army’s 
capabilities, however, its force size and force generation system, should provide commanders 
with adequate numbers of well-trained and deployable troops. Importantly, despite proposed 
budget cuts, France has been reluctant to substitute quality for quantity, as arguably U.K. has 
done. Indeed, the French MoD was able to keep major acquisition programmes. The one of the 
greatest issues French military commanders has been facing concerns lack of aircraft carriers, 
which significantly reduce French air forces deployability. The capability gab in this sector 
makes France highly dependent on allies support and justifies development of closer defence 
cooperation with the U.K. and U.S.A. However, France remains well-advanced military power in 
EU with regard to the medium-weight and high-tech force, which could repeat its contribution to 
the International Security Assistance Force and probably go beyond that. 
With regards to the defence integration process and EDEM development, France emphasizes its 
pro-European position. However, state’s efforts on creating a real “common” European defence 
and security policy have been rather unsuccessful. The problem lies within the Frenchidea that 
CSDP should in fact deals with security and defence, and the EU states should cooperate in these 
policy areas. Howover, most of EU 28 either don’t want to or cannot. The lack of strategic 
interest and/or inadequate capabilities limits possibilities for cooperation in security and defence 
matters. 
Historically, it is of strategic importance for France to maintain the autonomous DTIB based on 
independent intelligence. France makes sure to procced in developing necessary capacity to act 
independently on global arena, thus to maintain its power over strategic decisions and available 
capabilities. As the French military power has been decreasing over the years, the CSDP seems 
to be a logical and calculative instrument to increase France’s position on the international arena 









The end of the Cold War had a tremendous impact on the German military industry. In 10 
years German defence budget has been reduced by 25% in real terms, which represented a 
considerable loss of funds for the Bundeswehr. Consequently the arms procurement fund was 
reduced by the half, from 12 billion DM to 5.3 billion DM in 1989-1998.
148
 Following the drop 
off in amount of orders, military companies have been subjected to internal rationalization and 
business concentration. While some of the arms companies were forced to sell the enterprises or 
liquidate themselves or parts of the production facilities, the workforce for military industry had 
decreased of nearly 40%. Therefore, the aim of a concerted effort of the government and the 
military industry has been to preserve and develop the technological efficiency and competence 
of the industry in a way, which maintains it as a technological attractive and industrially essential 
partner for the production of weapon systems in international cooperation.
149
  
The necessary capacity reduction has led to restructuring of arms companies. As German 
companies faced a notable drop in their sales and some of them even exit the market, those 
which remained had to concentrate and focus on defence production. The one of significance is 
the merger of  Krauss-Maffei AG and the Wegmann & Co. GmbH in 1999 into Krauss-Maffei 
Wegmann (KMW) The resulting synergies, the broad product portfolio and the united system 
competencies enabled KMW to gain a leading position in the world market. Later, the company 
was awarded the procurement contract for the German Army’s armoured transporter. This 
contract was the largest procurement project placed in the German army industry at that time. 
The transformation of the Bundeswehr and also of the armament industry that occurred in the 
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6.1. POSITIONING OF THE STATE IN DEFENCE INDUSTRY 
Table 6: Positioning of German state in the defence industry 
Socio-economic environment - Weight of industry in the country and 
relatively weak DTIB 
- Weak public funding and support to the 
industry 
Political context - Re-unification  and Federal State 
State position as a customer - Trivialisation of defence industrial 
activites 
- Prioritization of national products 
Consequences to DTIB - Closed DTIB with national, specialized 
companies, mainly in aerospace, land and 
maritime equipment. 
- Export orientation and implementation 
in emerging countries.  
Source: Lember 2014 
 
The German model significantly differs from those of France and the UK. In aftermath of 
the Cold War the German government found itself in a complicated situation in regards to 
pursuing country’s defence policy objectives. From one side, it aimed to establish an 
autonomous national defence sector in the light of German reunification and in the context of 
European defence integration process. While on the other side, German government sought to 
downstream the cold war legacy by reducing military expenditure and restructuring weapons 
production. Consequently, military spending has decreased by 31.4% between 1990 and 1997. 
The decrease in acquisition funding in Germany in the same period was even larger at 58%. 
These policies reflected the belief of German authorities that the defence industry is dynamic and 




Moreover, since the end of the Cold War the state had nearly never held shares in German 
defence companies.
152
 With many arms producers choosing to discard from the national 
acquisition programmes, the German defence industry has relatively declined in the 1990’s . 
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Addressing these difficulties, the German government have started to prioritize domestic 
suppliers in its arms procurement programmes.  It had favored domestic companies in producing 
land and naval military equipment.
153
 Additionally, since 2009 the Defence Ministry has been 
implementing a policy of focusing its investments mainly into larger companies, hence limiting 
the ambition of SMEs. Likewise, the 11
th
 Amendment Act on foreign trade of July 2004 has 
introduced strict and systematic control over foreign acquisitions of defence companies, limiting 
possible share of acquisition to a quarter.
154
 Under these conditions, German arms producing 
companies became ultraspecialized and heavily dependent on public procurement orders, and as 





Interesting, that German Federal States involvement in the defence industry has a major impact 
on the development of some defence companies. For instance, OHB System AG, which is a 
major player in the European Galileo programme, has benefited largerly from the Bremen region 
support, growing in six times since 2004. This policy promotes developing of regional defence 
industrial centres and creates an opportunity to develop a robust network of SMEs. Although 
such regional cluster boosts cooperation between civil and military contractors, they also limited 
German companies’ interest in European integration. However, the recent successful merger 




Table 7: Capital Structure of major defence companies in Germany (as of 2016) 
 Public Private Number of 
Shareholders 
Majority investor Shares owned 
Atlas Elektronik  100% 2 Thyssen Krupp 51% 
Diehl BGT Defence  100% 1 Diehl family 100% 
KMW  100% 1 Wergnann & Co 100% 
Rheinmetall 
Defence 
 100% - Harris Associates 5.52% 
MTU Aero Engines  100% - Artisan Parthner 4.56% 
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OHB  100% - Fucks family 69.72% 
TKMS  100% 1 ThysseKrupp 
AG 
100% 
Source: Matelly et all (2016) 
 
6.2. DEFENCE SPENDING TRENDS 
Germany’s current trends in defence policy, the allocation of fundings and on-going 
structural reform of armed forces can be explained through broader government efforts to 
consolidate the federal budget and the intention to build a smaller, more flexible and fully 
capable all-volunteer force. Although defense budget cuts have been not as severe as in other 
European states, the state of the German DTIB has left much to be improved. The German 
defence sector has been significantly underfinanced during last decades. Consequently, there is a 
lack of equipment and facilities, which are necessary to respond to the broad range of possible 
threats to the national security.  In terms of military reform, the government has decided to 
maintain the broadest spectrum of military capabilities possible, while accepting a reduced 
ability to sustain troops for long deployments abroad. 
Figure 8: Germany and the EU military expenditure as % of GDP in 1988-2015 
 
Source: SIPRI|WORLDBANK DATABASE 
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In comparison to other major military powers in the EU, Germany spends significantly 
less on defence, around 1.2 percent in 2015. (See figure 8) During the initial years of economic 
and budgetary crisis in Europe, German chose to respond in a similar manner as other European 
states in order to secure defence fundings in times of budgetary austerity. However, from 2008 to 
2010, European members of NATO cut on average 7.4 percent of their military expenditure. Yet 
Germany’s defense budget grew by 1.4 percent in real terms and has proceeded to increase 
slowly since then, with the exception of 2011.
157
  
From the one side, the slow growth in the state’s defence budget may designate a positive 
tendency in terms of the defence sector’s development; however, in reality it is rather 
questionable. Germany already has been spending considerably less than others European major 
military powers, and the further reduction of defence fundings would not be an option, if the 
state was willing to maintain its commitment to full spectrum of defence capacity. However, 
even if the German military cannot be described as drained of resources as the British one, it has 
been subject to series of deep cuts while being in the middle of constantly changing political and 
economic environment within the federation. The German military is committed to a full 
spectrum of capabilities and has been going through a set of reforms aimed to restructure the 
armed forces, foremost to make it more einsatzfähig
158




In 2009 Germany introduced the so-called ‘debt-brake’ legalislation, which was constitutionally 
enshrined in the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz).  Under its provisions, the federal government 
must cut its structural deficit to 0.35 percent of GDP to 2016 and onwards. The idea is to slash 
public debt from unprecedented 80 percent by setting out a flexible fiscal tool which can limit 
possibility of politics interference to and manipulation of public debt.
160
  
Simultaneously, Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Cabinet initiated the reform of the German armed 
forces as a part of budget consolidation effort. The Ministry of Defence was expected to generate 
savings of €8.3bn between 2011 and 2014, lately extended till 2015. Taking into consideration 
that the annual German defense budget was only about €30 billion, the expected reduction was 
substantial, especially for a military entity already existing on very limited means.  However, it 
was decided that almost half of the cost reductions would come from spending on personnel. 
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Alongside, the size of the German armed forces, the Bundeswehr, would shrink significantly. 
Particularly, planners hoped to cover most of cost reductions by closing several hundred of 
military facilities and through cutting the overall size of the military personnel to 185,000. 
Additionally, it was agreed that the suspension of conscription and rationalization in 
procurement, as well as revision of administration would take place. Moreover, the Commission 
on Structural Reforms noted that defence budget cuts should open the door to new options for 
savings through better pooling and sharing with EU and NATO partners.
161
 
However, it became apparent that restructuring of the German armed forces would cost money 
before it saves it. The MoD so far was not able to generate the savings it agreed to. The defense 
budget cuts have been implemented were more modest than it was primarily suggested. When in 
2011 Thomas de Maizière took over the responsibilities of Minister of Defence, he was able to 
lobby defence budget cuts with administration. Consequently, it was agreed that the MoD will 
receive up to €1 billion per year in additional funds to manage the costs of downsizing.
162
  
After all, in 2012 German defense budget has increased by 320 million. And spending on 
personnel corresponded to 49.9 percent of the defence budget in 2012, down from 52.5 percent 
in the previous year. Meanwhile, spending on defense investment, particularly on equipment 
procurement plus research and development increased slightly in number of 0.4 percent in 2012. 
The five year planning for the federal budget provides an indication of the medium term outlook 
for defense spending.  Defence budget cuts in absolute terms have been scheduled to begin in 
2014, with the budget for 2015 and 2016 fixed at €31.5 billion in each year.
163
 However, as the 
German Cabinet has adopted the federal budget for 2017 and the financial plan to 2020, the 
defence budget has de-facto been raised by almost to €36.61 billion. The funds for military 




6.3. ARMED FORCES STRUCTURAL REFORMS AND PUBLIC DEFENCE 
PROCUREMENT 
In the light of the budgetary crisis, the procurement of defence equipment has been a 
subject to major changes. The process of downsizing and/or suspending certain defence 
acquisition projects has been a sensitive issue to the national defence indusrty and the MoD. As 
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such, the actual scope of reform in this area should be determined by a constructive agreement 
between two institutions, as a cancellation of procurement contracts would incur penalties for the 
MoD that might make cancellation economically unsound. 
As a part of the Bundeswehr reform, series of equipment cuts should comprises both reduction of 
in-service equipment and cancelation of procurement projects in the future (see the table below). 
For instance, in the Army the stock of the Leopard II main battle tank will shrink from 350 to 
225 and the numbers of the new Infantry Fighting Vehicle Puma will be downsized from 410 to 
350.  
The Air Force will only receive 80 NH90 Light Transport Helicopters (instead of 122 initially 
ordered). Furthermore, there will be only one Tiger attack helicopter regiment equipped by 40 
Tiger Combat Support Helicopters (instead of 80 initially ordered), 140 Typhoon Multirole 
Combat Aircraft (instead of 177 initially ordered) and 40 A400M Transport Aircraft (instead of 
60 initially ordered). Additionally, the Air Force will retire 20 of the C-160 Transall Transport 
Aircraft and reduce flight hours. The government has also indicated that it is likely to cancel its 
order of tranche 3B Eurofighter jets (37 aircraft), which would leave Germany with a total of 140 
Eurofighters in its inventory. 
 The Navy has already taken its six 206A submarines out of service. The biggest reductions will 
be seen with the eight F122 frigates put out of service and only six instead of eight Multirole 
Combat Ships 180 will be procured. The fleet of more modern 212A Class submarines will grow 
by 2 units as well as number of K130 Corvettes to replace F122 frigates. In addition, the number 
of Marine Helicopters will be reduced from 43 to 30.
165
 (See Table 8) 
Table 8: Structural change in German Defence Procurement 
Project/System Current or originally 
planned number 
New ceiling 
Combat tank Leopard II 350 225 
Armored personnel carriers Puma/Marder 410/70 350/0 
Armored howitzer 2000 148 89 
Multiporporse helicopter NH-90 122 80 
Support helicopter Tiger 80 40 
Eurofighter Typhoon 177 140 
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Combat aircraft Tornado 185 85 
Transport aircraft C-160/A400M 80/60 60/40 
Multiporpose warship (MKS 180) 8 6 
Naval mine countermeasures unit 20 10 
Source: Federal Ministry of Defence, ‘Ressortbericht zum Stand der Neausrichtung der Bundeswehr.” May 
2013 p.24 
 
However, the streamlining of the procurement of defence capabilities was highly 
problematic and did not go as smooth as military personnel cuts. Particularly, in February 2014, 
the new German Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen dismissed her secretary of state, 
Stephane Beemelmans, who was responsible for defence procurement along the director of the 
procurement department. Such decision was justified by numerous troubles the MoD has been 
facing with its major defence procurement projects. These problems can be charatcterised by a 
mix of interdependent tendencies of rising costs, delivery delays, failures to meet technical 
requirements within ineffective management in overall. Apparently, the German arms industry 




The main problems within defence procurement emerged due to the larger costs than it was 
initially estimated; frequent failures to deliver in time; supplies of defected materiel or the one 
which does not meet the technical requirements set by the administration. This applies to almost 
all the important German defence procurement projects.(see Table 9). 
Table 9: German major defence procurement projects (selected) 










1998 2004-2015 (tranche 1,33) 
2009-2015 (trance 2,31) 
2015-2018 (tranche 3a, 37) 




A400M Airbus 2003 2014 - … 40 (reduced 
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1998 2010 - … 








2000 2013 - … 








2004 2010 - … 
(not yet in service because 
adjustments still necessary;  




Type 125 frigate ThyssenKrup
p MS and 
Lurssen 
2007 2017 - … 
(planned from 2016) 
4 
212A submarine Thyssen 
Trupp MS 
1994 2005-2011 (first 4) 
2015 - … (remaining 2) 





p MS and 
Lurssen 
2001 2008 (first 2) 
2012 (remaining 3) 
(planned in 2007 and 2008) 
5 
Source: BERICHT ZUM STAND DER Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr, 2013 
 
6.4. DEFENCE INDUSTRY: SUPPLY SIDE 
Due to constantly changing external and internal circumstances, the German defence 
industry has been facing certain challenges. Domestic arms sales market in Germany is 
contractual. In the light of the budgetary crisis and decrease in numbers of defence acquisitions 
the orders from the Bundeswehr are slowing down significantly. Additionally, major EU 
customers of German arms manufacturers have been going through serious budget cuts including 
defence-related costs. This, in turn, negatively affected the scope of their orders for new 
armament and military equipment. Therefore, German arm industry has to re-orginised itself and 
to look for new sales market opportunities outside Trans-Atlantic partnership.  
The German arms industry is highly diverse. Several German manufacturers are part of the 
largest international arms-producing companies manufacturing complete systems, such as Airbus 
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Group (including Airbus, Airbus Defence & Space, and Airbus Helicopters) and MBDA 
(MBDA Deutschland). However, as it was outlined above, most defence constructors in 
Germany are private companies that are exclusively German-owned. There are many relatively 
large companies, which hold well-established position  and are known mainly for manufacturing 
and exporting systems for land and naval forces. For instance, ThyssenKrupp Industrial 
Solutions (TKIS with the ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems/TKMS industry cluster) and Lürssen 
Defence manufacture boats and warships for the navy. Rheinmetall Defence and Krauss-Maffei 
Wegmann specialized in production of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery and armoured 
carriers for land troops. 
 Moreover, the military industry includes small and medium-sized companies. Such firms 
include OHB-System (design, construction and installation of satellites), Diehl Defence (guided 
missles and air defence systems), Carl Zeiss (optical systems), Rohde-Schwarz (electronic test 
equipment, broadcasting equipment, detection systems), Plath (radiolocation, radio 
reconnaissance), ESG (information, communication and navigation systems), Atlas Elektronik 
(maritime systems and electronics).  
German arms companies have established a large network of connections with various foreign 
companies inside and outside of Europe. For instance, there are German subsidiaries of Airbus 
Group, which cooperate with Airbus subsidiaries in other EU countries on such joint projects as: 
the Eurofighter, the A400M transport aircraft, the NH90 medium-size transport helicopter, and 
the Tiger combat support helicopter. Likewise, several German companies successfully 
established cooperation with foreign firms in the U.S., Israel, etc. on specific projects. In the 
same time, small and medium-sized firms have been supplying subsystems for foreign 
companies, in Europe and beyond (such companies as MTU Aero Engines and MTU 
Friedrichshafen).
167
 Importantly, German arms companies are private, with the exception of 
Airbus Group (formerly EADS), in which the German government holds a 12% stake. 
The Bundeswehr remains the most important customer of the military equipment produced by 
domestic companies. In 2011, just 17% of the defence industry’s products were exported. 
Moreover, the quantity of imported goods was very low (3%), thus, German arm-producing 
companies have been able to satisfy demands of the Bundeswehr and of federal security 
agencies. Additionally, the Bundeswehr has financed large-scale research and development 
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projects which allow arm-producing companies to develop advanced military equipment. In turn, 
this implies that the level of financial support provided to German arms manufacturers is 
primarily influenced by the future needs of the Bundeswehr. Therefore, it is possible to argue 
that German MoD favors domestic arm-producing companies over foreign ones due to different 
political and economic reasons.
168
 
It is worth to notice that Germany is the third among the world biggest weapons suppliers, 
behind only of Russia and the U.S and in front of France and U.K. According to federal 
government figures, since 2005 German’s arms export grow of about 1.5 billion euros a year, 
with the unprecedented sales in 2010 due to 2.1 billion euros contract on submarine sales to 
Portugal and Greece. However, the actual value of German arms exports is difficult to determine 
as the data published by the federal government is incomplete and doesn’t correspond to the one 
published by SIPRI. 
Importantly, it is possible to distinguish certain shift in the destination of German arms exports. 
Until recently, about three quarters of export was oriented towards counties within NATO and 
EU. However, in 2011, the ratio reversed – with just 32% of arms sales in NATO, EU and 
equivalent markets, and as much as 68% being purchased by third countries. This trend was 
observed to continue in 2012 with export ration of 41% and 59%, respectively, this, in turn, 
indicated a new turn in export strategy of German arms manufacturers. 
Indeed there is a growing shift in export destinations of the German defence companies towards 
third countries. In the first four months of 2014, Germany authorized arms exports worth 1.2 
billion euros, with a slight fall from the previous year, according to the Economy Ministry. 
Meanwhile, the number of German arms exports for that period to non-EU or non-NATO states 
increased by 130 million euros.
169
  
Furthermore, the German arms sales have increased dramatically since 2014, nearly doubling in 
size in 2015 and estimate to double in 2016. Thus, Germany has become the  third-largest arms 
exporter in the world in 2015 with the arms sales total of 4.8 bilion USD, ranking below the 
United States and Russia, as it stated in annual defence industry report compiled by British 
publishing company IHS Jane's.
170
  It is possible to argue, that the massive increase in arms sales 
is linked to the revival of German militarism and it desire to lead more often and more decisively 
on the global arena. This not only requires more Bundeswehr missions abroad, but also the direct 
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arming of warring parties. Thereof, a large ammount of the small arms trade in 2015 went to the 
Kurdish Peshmerga in Irag and to the development of a German-European defence industry.
171
 
As IHS Janes’s report indicates, nearly a third (29 per cent) of German arms exports went to the 
Middle East and North Africa, with Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Egypt and Qatar are the main 
recipients. With the estimated continuous growth in arms sales in 2016, Germany continues to 
develop an export-oriented defence policy.
172
 (See figure 9) 




6.5. DEFENCE COOPERATION AND POOLING AND SHARING OPTIONS 
The MoD had been assessing opportunities for German defence to benefit from military 
cooperation, especially under framework of CSDP.  It notices that pooling and sharing of 
military capabilities is a potential way to achieve budget savings and to enhance rationality of the 
member states’ defence capabilities. Therefore, the German government supports the long-term 
goal of fully capable European Forces and shares an aspiration to develop further common 
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functions (such as air security) among member states. Additionally, the MoD highlights that the 
greater savings could be achieved through strong European procurement cooperation. Yet until 
recently, and as it was outlined earlier, the German policy in promoting European defense 
integration contradicts rather protectionist defense industrial policy.  
Nevertheless, currently German participates in various pooling and sharing initiatives. 
Particularly, Germany and Sweden introduced the Ghent Initiative in 2010, which is generally 
recognized as the starting point for Pooling and Sharing within EU. The main goals of the 
initiative are to maintain and enhance military capabilities of the participants, to solve 
duplication in national militaries assets, as well as to improve interoperability, military 
efficiency, sustainability and reduce unnecessary spendings. Following the initiative, the EDA 
was chosen to provide framework for P&S projects. In other words, the main objective of the 




Furthermore, in April 2010, the Weimar initiative was proposed by France, Germany and 
Poland. The states proposed to strengthen CSDP capabilities through increased 
multilateralization and pooling of forces. Particularly, this could be achieved through reforming 
the EU Battle Groups, setting up an EU headquarters and jointly develop military capabilities 
and assets on EU level.
174
 The initiative has been welcomed by the High Representative and EU 
member states expect U.K., and has been pushed towards the EU/EAD level and joined by Italy 
and Spain later. In 2012 the five countries of Weimar Plus signed a Declaration on European 
Defence to support further cooperation in security and defence matters on EU level. The main 
issues addressed in the Declaration are to facilitate cooperation on high added-values capacities, 
reinforce the EDTIB and strengthen cooperation in R&T activities. (Wiemar Plus Group, 
2012)
175
 Nevertheless, there was a little success in pushing forward the implementation of the 
Initiative; the establishment of the EU Operation Centre in 2012 is probably the greatest 
accomplishment so far. 
On the bilateral level Franco-German defence cooperation established more than 50 years ago 
have been successful to a very little extent. The most significant achievements are numerous 
personnel exchange programmes, creation of the Franco-German Brigade (FGB) and the 2010 
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European Air Transport Command (EATC). Besides these achievements the cooperation 
between the states’ defence industries seems to be very weak. It can be explained through to 
substantially different perceptions of the state’s role in defence industry, different political 
opinions on planning, launching and implementing of military operations. Such differences 
might also explain the reason that vast friendship structures do not deliver proportionally to the 
effort put into them: over the last years, the two states have not been very successful in 
developing substantial cooperation projects. The multilateral relationship appears to be stuck at 
between the rhetorical level of well-intentioned statements and the administrative level of well-
organised processes. Although the recent establishment of “Franco-German Agenda 2020” 
within which the states formulated objectives in operational, political, and defence industry 
cooperation, there has been little improvement so far. Germany and France have been straggling 
to produce significant results.
176
 
6.6. APPROACH TO CSDP 
Germany sees itself as one of the driving forces behind European cooperation. Especially, 
in the area of security and defence cooperation Germany took a leading role in the setting out of 
the CSDP and its further promotion. Importantly, from a German perspective, the comprehensive 
nature of CSDP, that comprises civilian and military means, prevails over other multinational 
engagements, particularly NATO, which lacks sizeable civilian instruments. Nevertheless, 
NATO remains the preferred framework for any robust military engagement that Germany might 
decide to engage. In other words, German doesn’t see the CSDP as an alternative to NATO, but 
rather as complementary to it, with the ability to deploy the whole range of soft power tools 
along military ones. Important to mention, German also views the CSDP as a tool for achieving 
further cooperation and integration among EU member states. In fact, this perception of the 
CSDP‘s role appears to be more important for Germany rather than developing the CSDP to 
achieve the EU’s military capabilities independence from NATO.
177
 
Particularly, Germany’s decision whether engages or not in different missions usually based on 
perception of the framework and objectives of a given mission. For instance, when robust 
military means are required, Germany prefers NATO due to its military structure and 
capabilities. However, in case a mission’s mandate needs not only military means to achieve 
stated goals, from German perspective the involvement under CSDP framework might provide 
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more advantages with its broader toolbox of political, diplomatic and economic means. 
Meanwhile, a UN mission might be preferential when international legitimacy is required. 
Therefore, it is possible to argue that German priorities for whichever multilateral framework a 
mission to be carried out are decided on a case-by-case basis, depending on the mission’s needs, 
with no preference for the EU or NATO.  
Talking about Germany’s strategic interests, it seems that the Germany’s core priorities lie 
within regional security and stability in Europe and its Neighborhood as well as economic 
concerns. This accounts to a common perception among German’s politicians that conventional 
threats present no current danger for German territorial integrity or for the democratic foundation 
of the state. Alongside, due to historical reasons, constitutional restriction and overall skepticism 
in domestic political cycles, Germany has a clear preference for using the variety of non-military 
means. The decisions on military engagements are driving by the principle of using force as a 
last resort under multinational framework and only in case with high probability of success.
178
 
Important to notice, that one of the guiding principles of German policy in regards to CSDP is a 
high level of participation in the mission. Particularly, Germany has had contribute to every 
launched operations under the CSDP framework, with exception of the withdrawal from EUFOR 
Althea in 2012. This tendency corresponds to German’s perception of the CSDP as a civilian, 
preventive and multilateral crisis management entity, as none of the 27 launched operations 
under CSDP framework was a robust combat mission.  
Nevertheless, it appears that beyond European integration and a safe environment to facilitate 
global trade, Germany lacks a long-term strategic vision. Ultimately, this also translated into a 
lack of strategic vision for Europe or the further development of the CSDP, beyond the rather 
empty rhetoric of ‘more Europe’ and deeper integration.  
6.7. CONCLUSION 
In the course of economic and budgetary crisis, German Defence sector was subject to 
major budget cuts and has been in the throes of a significant effort to transform its force structure 
to more advance and expeditionary force. Thus, Germany is officially committed to preserving 
full-spectrum capabilities, meanwhile moving to a medium force structure, which should be 
more deployable and sustainable. Therefore, it is possible to argue that Germany seeks to adjust 
its armed forces to reality of the current security threats, and maintain its positions as 
economically and military advanced actor within EU. In the conventional military balance 





among Europe’s big powers, Germany is slowly catching up mainly because of the severe 
defense budget cuts in both France and the United Kingdom.
179
  
Alongside, Germany has been one of the greatest supporters for the development of the defence 
cooperation within EU. Germany favors defence integration under the CSDP framework as it 
directly correlates and provides to its primarily strategic interest in establishment of European 
regional security and stability. Nevertheless, NATO remains preferred framework for any robust 
military engagement that Germany might participate in.  
Taking into account neorealist insights of state behavior patterns, it is possible to argue that 
Germany seeks to maximize its military and economic power through cooperation on EU and 
international level. Moreover, German’s approach to multilateral cooperation is primarily driven 
by its own national interests and by more pragmatic and instrumental considerations. In the 
context of balanced multipolarity within EU, Germany recognizes the benefits of regional 
economic and defence cooperation as a means of competing with the USA and Japan; for milieu-
shaping in European Neighborhood; and for the collective pursuit of shared second-order ethical 
concerns.
180
 From the other hand, if German interests competing with other EU member states’ 
interests, it tends to act independently in the sake of own benefits. For example, Germany 
opposed the UN Secretary-General’s request for the deployment of a CSDP military crisis 
management operation in eastern DRC in 2008 given, due to the risk-averse political culture 




The last but not least, due to the tight budgetary constraints of the Bundeswehr, the German 
MoD seeks to advanced gains and minimize losses through comprehensive Pooling and Sharing 
approach. Nevertheless, the P&S arrangements are making little progress these days due a 
multitude of challenges, such as German’s perception of the CSDP as a primarily ‘soft power’ 
instrument that contradicts other states’ vision of the role of the CSDP.  Furthermore, despite 
various EU initiatives in facilitating defence cooperation and harmonizing procurement process, 
Germany retains its protectionist approach within the defence policy. As well as recent failures 
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of some P&S projects, such as producing of the German-Italian-America missile defence 
program (MEADS) or failure to use the Franco-German combat brigade in Afghanistan 
undermined German’s willingness to launch or engage in the following initiatives.  
 
7. THE UNITED KINGDOM 
7.1. POSITIONING OF THE STATE IN DEFENCE INDUSTRY 
From early 1980s the government of the U.K. has been executing liberal policy towards 
the national market. This has led to the major privatization of defence companies. The national 
authorities assumed that offering greater autonomy to defence contractors would lead to their 
restructuring in response to shrinking public resources and rising production costs.
182
 The so-
called Levene Reforms (after Peter Levene, the Chief of Defence Procurement un that time) 
transitioned the national defence industry into open and increasingly competitive model. 
Although, this policy has forced U.K. defence contractors to rationalize, they found it 
challenging to develop extremely expensive weapon systems and invest in R&D as the fixed 
price contracts have harden the calculation of the potential project costs in the end of the 
production. The tremendous completion led to inadequate costs overruns and neglect of the 
quality of final products, the MoD was unsatisfied.
183
 Therefore, in December 2001, the U.K. 
revised defence acquisition model that would establish a better relationship between the state and 
the industry, as well as it would provide more investment into early project phases.
184
 (See table 
10) 
Table 10: The U.K. State Positioning in defence industry 
Socio-economic environment - Deindustrialization followed by financialization 
- Liberalization and privatization 
Political context - Importance and wellness of force in external operations 
- Liberalization and privatizaton 
State position as customer - Best value for money: public-private partnership 
- Low involvement and outsourcing 
Consequences for DTIB - Focus on transatlantic businesses with strong EU 
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- Core of large companies specialized in defence 
- High proportion of diverse institutional investors 
Source: Lember 2014 
Another consequence of the U.K. policy of defence market liberalization in the 1990s 
was defence industrial consolidation. Notably, the defence industry consolidation has been taken 
further than in other European states and the industrial structure is now relatively stable.
185
 The 
most significant consolidation was the acquisition of GEC Marconi by British Aerospace that led 
to the creation of BAE Systems in 1999. From then on, the BAE System has become a major 
prime contractor developing wide range of products, from fast jet combat aircrafts to nuclear 
submarines.
186
 TO summer up, in the response to the state’s market liberalization policy, under 
the competition pressure the SMEs were forced to restructure and larger companies to specialize 
within the field of excellence. Apart from such cases as Rolls Royce, the majority of British 
defence contractors remain very specialized, probably to the national trend to divest from 
industrial activities in favor of the financial marketplace.
187
 
7.2. DEFENCE SPENDING TRENDS 
The economic and financial crisis struck Britain’s national budget particularly hard, 
increasing public debt from 51.9 percent in 2008 to over 90 percent in 2013 of GDP. The British 
Ministry of Defence was already struggling to cope with significant funding cuts while 
sustaining operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Iraq along with overcommitted defence 
procurement projects. With the objective to reduce deficit budget by 8 percent until 2014, the 
United Kingdom’s coalition government launched the Strategic Defence and Security Review 
(SDSR) in October 2010.
188
  
In order to cope with fiscal deficit and prolonged period of austerity in public expenditure, the 
SDSR has imposed reduction of defence spending with the MoD facing cuts in the core defence 
budget of 8 percent in real terms between 2010/11 and 2013/14.  The departmental limit for 
defence was set out at £33.8bn in 2011-12, £34.4bn in 2012-13, £34.1bn in 2013-14 and £33.5bn 
                                                          
185
 DIS, op. cit., p. 26. 
186
 A. James and P. Hall, “Industry structure, procurement and innovation in the UK defence sector” 2009 
187
 Matelly, Sylvie and Marcos Lima. “The influence of the State on the strategic choices of Defence Companies: the 
cases of Germany, France and the EU after the Cold War”, Journal of Innovation Economics and Management 
2016/2 (n°20),p.70 
188






 The Review aimed to provide the resources needed to defend the UK and its 
interests, and to fulfill the Government’s objectives addressed one day earlier in the National 
Security Strategy (NSS).
190
While the NSS addresses a large list of core threats, such as 
international terrorism, cyber-warfare and natural hazards, the SDSR is concentrated on the 
military and material dimension of the state’s security and defence. Furthermore, the SDSR 
stresses that U.K. remains a distinctive military power on international scene with ability to 
operate across the spectrum from high-intensity intervention to enduring stabilization activity. 
However, it is assumed that besides certain scale of selected operations, the U.K. is likely to be 
engaged in either type of warfare only within an international coalition framework, usually led 
by the US. The potential scenarios for engagement vary from robust inter-state warfare to 
fighting small-scale intra-state conflicts.  
Taking into account proposed austerity measures which negatively impact all branches of British 
army; it is arguable whether the SDSR is actually able to deliver an effectively balanced force 
structure to meet U.K. strategic objectives. As the Defence Select Committee stated in its report:  
"the 2010 SDSR and the 2010 NSS were governed by the overriding strategic objective of 
reducing the UK's budget deficit … we have found it difficult to divine any other genuinely 
strategic vision in either document".
191
 It is possible to conclude that there were four main 
concerns in regard to the SDSR 2010: the feasibility of the Future Force 2020 plan, existing 
capability gaps, and various inconsistencies in the national strategic planning framework, and 




The U.K. has addressed some of the shortfalls of the SDSR 2010 in publishing new SDSR and 
NSS in 2015. It has announced that it will be spent £178 billion over the next decade on arms 
equipment and related costs.
193
 This added extra £12 billion to the MOD’s defence equipment 
plan published in October 2015, which set a budget of £166 billion for defence equipment for the 
following ten years.
194
 This allows the U.K. to meet NATO’s guideline to spend 2 per cent of 
GDP on defence in 2016. According to SIPRI database, the U.K. military expenditure has been 
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slightly falling in 2010-2014 following the budget cuts introduced in the SDSR 2010. Thus,in 




Figure 10: U.K. military expenditure as percent of GDP, 1988-2015 
 
Source: SIPRI database 
 
7.3. ARMED FORCES STRUCTURAL REFORMS AND DEFENCE 
PROCUREMENT  
In the SDSR 2010 the government coalition introduced budget cuts in two time-frames. 
An initial short time-frame is concentrated on maintaining British troops in Afghanistan as part 
of NATO-led ISAF by the time of planned withdrawal in 2014. The long-term layout was set out 
in relations to Britain’s defense capabilities in post-Afghanistan period and economic austerity 
with a focus on 2020 – with an assumption that the state would not engage in military operations 
in the meantime except in case of emergency. This allowed U.K. government to justify essential 
cuts to the armed forces with hopes to regenerate some of them by 2020.  
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In response to the SDSR provisions, on 5 July 2012, the Ministry of Defence announced a major 
re-structuring of the British Army – the so-called ‘Army 2020’ plan
196
  - with objective to deliver 
a smaller but more adaptable military force. Therefore, the Army is cutting the number of 
regulars from 102,000 in 2010 to 82,000 by 2017, but seeking to increase the number of reserve 
forces to 30,000.
197
 Following the “Army 2020” plan, the SDSR 2015 commits to maintain an 
Army of 82,000 and plans to increase the Reserves to 35,000.
198
 
To reduce the growing gap in Britain’s fixed wing carrier capability, U.K. decided to buy the 
variant of the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft (JSF) the F-35B which is capable of short take-off and 
vertical landing (STOVL) and eventually to be flying from new carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth. In 
January 2014 U.K. government finally agreed to order the 14 aircraft expected to form the first 
operational squadron in 2018 and be ready to deploy on the UK’s new aircraft carriers in 
2019.
199
Meanwhile, the current carrier capability to be reduced to one ship with the other either 
sold, held in reserve, or used as a replacement for the helicopter carrier. This ship is HMS Ocean 
and it due to leave service by 2020. It is worthy to mention that U.K. remains committed to the 
contract on acquirement of two HMS Queen Elizabeth, with first vessels to  gain full operational 
capability by 2020. The SDSR 2015 confirms that two new Queen Elizabeth class aircraft 
carriers will enter service from 2018.
200
 
7.3.1. THE ROYAL NAVY 
The Royal Navy’s surface fleet has been reduced from 22 to 19 destroyers and frigates. In 
turn, this has raised serious concerns whether the Navy is capable of sustaining existing 
commitments. Likewise, the amphibious capability has been reduced to only one HMS Albion 
remaining in service, and other one put in reserve. Thus, the Navy will now only be able to 
deploy an amphibious force built around a Royal Marine Commando (battalion equivalent) 
rather than a full brigade.
201
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Furthermore, the government has ordered seven new Astute class nuclear submarines (SSNs), 
which should replace the Trafalgar class.
202
 As by May 2014 only three SSNs were put into 
service, there is the risk that in the next decade the Navy will not have sufficient SSNs to cover 
its operational commitments as the Trafalgar class submarines to be retire by 2022.
203
  
Problems with the development of the Nimrod MRA4 aircraft led to nine of them being 
scrapped, leaving U.K. without a maritime patrol aircraft capability. The project was ditched by 
the government in October's Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and would save the 
MoD an estimated £2bn over the next 10 years. However, a replacement might be introduced in 
the future.
204
 Along with planned changes in the Royal Navy capabilities, the SDSR 
recommended further restructuring measures. (See Table 11) 
Table 11: National Defence Cuts in regards to the British Royal Navy 
Type of cut Cut description Time frame 
equipment Decommission HMS Ark Royal immediately. immediatly 
equipment Decommission either the helicopter landing ship HMS Ocean or 
HMS Illustrious following a short study of which would provide 
the most effective helicopter platform capability, and place one 
landing and command ship at extended readiness. 
By 2020 
equipment Decommission four frigates and a Bay-class amphibious support 
ship. 
 
equipment Rationalise the Royal Navy estate.  
Source: U.K. Cabinet Office, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and 
Security Review (SDSR), Part 2 (Cm 7048), October 2010. 
 
7.3.2. THE BRITISH ARMY 
According to the SDSR and following reports on ‘Army 2020’, the manpower of land 
forces to be significantly reduced. The regular Army is set to fall from 104,000 to 90,000 by 
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2015, and 82-84,000 by 2020. From the other hand, in order to compensate such loses in 
personnel, the Territorial Army will increase to 36-38,000, giving a combined strength of 
120,000. Over the 2010-20 timeframe, the Army is also scheduled to withdraw its peacetime 
garrison from Germany. As the MoD announced in 2013, 11,000 soldiers will leave Germany by 
2016, and the remaining 4,500 will come return to the U.K. in 2019. This will save to British 
Army of about £240m annually.
205
  
Additionally, the numbers of defence equipment to be cut significantly, particularly in 
Challenger main battle tanks and AS90 self-propelled guns. Apparently, there will be no funding 
provided for acquisition of a new family of armored vehicles (FRES), that the Army had been 
exploring for a decade.
206
 The scale of cuts introduced within the SDSR 2010 is summarized in 
the Table 12. 
Table 12: Initially planned National Defence Cuts in regards to the British Army 
Type of cut Cut description Time frame 
personnel An assumed reduction of 1,000 personnel (from a total of 95,000 
to 94,000 personnel). 
(revised in ‘Army 2020’ report) 
by 2020 
personnel Reduce by one the number of deployable brigades, so five 
functioning multi-role brigades. 
 
equipment Reduce holdings of Challenger 2 tanks by around 40%  
equipment Reduce holdings of heavy artillery by around 35%.  
equipment Significantly reduce our non-deployable regional administrative 
structure. 
 
equipment Rationalise the deployable headquarters by reducing the 
communications and logistics support to Headquarters ARRC and 
convert the second of our operational divisional headquarters to a 
force preparation role. 
 
Source: U.K. Cabinet Office, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and 
Security Review (SDSR), Part 2 (Cm 7048), October 2010. 
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7.3.3. THE ROYAL AIR FORCE 
The significant reduction of the number of platforms has been taking place in order to 
accumulate necessary savings. The SDSR determined that the Royal Air Force by the 2020s will 
be based around a fleet of two of the most capable fighter jets in the world: a modernised 
Typhoon fleet fully capable of air-to-air and air-to-ground missions; and the Joint Strike Fighter, 
the world’s most advanced multi-role combat jet. The fast jet fleet will be complemented by a 
growing fleet of Unmanned Air Vehicles. Consequently, the Tornado F3 and Harriers ground 
attack aircraft have been taken out of service.
207
  
The Tornado GR4 force has been reduced by two units in 2011 to five frontline squadrons. The 
delivery of Eurofighter Typhoons has been troubled by delays in manufacture and by the 
diversion of aircraft to Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the initially planned numbers of Eurofighters 
and JSFs, which should form the core of the Air Force’s fast jet fleet, have been reduced. The 
UK has now ordered a total of 160 of the aircraft - well short of the 232 originally planned when 
the project was first unveiled in the 1998 SDSR. According to the Eurofighter Typoon 
conglomerate, the RAF is the biggest Eurofighter Typhoon customer with the 100th aircraft 
delivered to No 1 (Fighter) Squadron at RAF Leuchars in January 2013.
208
  
Moreover, the final capacity of the RAF was projected with consideration that some 53 
Eurofighter Tranche 1s are scheduled to leave service between 2015 and 2018. Furthermore, the 
acquisition programme for JSFs, which originally comprised 150 aircraft for the Navy and Air 
Force, has been reduced to 138. Furthermore, instead of planned acquisition of 25, the U.K. 
committed to 22 A400M transport aircraft to replace the C-130 Hercules fleet, with the first is 
scheduled to enter operational service in late 2014.
209
 
The C-17 fleet will continue to grow with the acquisition of an eighth aircraft, and possibly two 
more in order to facilitate the force withdrawal from Afghanistan. However, the support 
helicopter force has been set for cuts. It will receive 14 new Chinooks as initially planned, but 
only after the Afghanistan drawn down. Additionally, the number of Air Force’s fleet of Pumas 
helicopter to be upgrades was reduced to 24 instead of 28 originally planned. In 2013 around 
seven of the Puma Mk2s, which are being upgraded by Eurocopter under the £260m life 
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extension programme contract, have been delivered to RAF Benson.
210
 The Air Force’s 
intelligence and surveillance capabilities are also being scaled back.
211
 Along with mentioned the 
main provisions within the SDSR in regards to the RAF are summarized in the Table 13. 
Table 13: National Defence Cuts in regards to the British Royal Air Force 
Type of cut Cut description Time 
frame 
equipment Withdraw the C-130 Hercules transport fleet ten years earlier than 
planned as we transition to the more capable and larger A400M. 
2020 
equipment Withdraw the Sentinel surveillance aircraft once it is no longer 
required to support operations in Afghanistan. 
 
equipment Rationalise the RAF estate.  
equipment Retain Tornados, which will continue to operate in Afghanistan.  
 Equipment 
 
Remove Harrier from service in the transition to a future fast jet 
force of Typhoon and JSF. This will mean a gap for carrier fast jet 
operations. JSF, like Harrier, will be operated jointly by RAF and 
Royal Navy pilots. 
 
equipment Not bring into service the Nimrod MRA4.  
equipment Withdraw VC-10 and the three variants of Tristar aircraft as 
transition is towards the more capable A330 future strategic 
transport and tanker aircraft. 
from 2013 
Source: U.K. Cabinet Office, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and 
Security Review (SDSR), Part 2 (Cm 7048), October 2010. 
Despite the cuts on equipment, the SDSR2015 announced that Ministry of Defence would 
build eight of the new Type 26 Global Combat Ships (which are replacing the current Type 23 
frigates), rather than the 13 originally planned, and instead it is planned to develop and build a 
new class of lighter general purpose frigate.
212
 
Through analysing the on-going process of Britain’s armed forces restructuration, it is possible 
to argue that introduced defence budget cuts have a significant impact on U.K. ability to project 
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and sustain military power, which reflected the lowering of the level of ambition. As a result, 
Britain will still be able to launch independent operations as it did in Sierra Leone in 2000 or 
contribute to various multinational operations such as the deployment to Libya. But unless the 
UK has air, land and maritime forces within required range, it will be problematic for Britain to 
engage in high-intensity operations against a sophisticated opponent until the new equipment is 
available. 
With consideration of the analysis of U.K. armed forces and major procurement projects 
provided above, it is worthy to note that U.K. has been looking to change the way it procure and 
support the military due to never-ending delivery delays and cost overruns to major equipment 
programs. The procurement and support of the equipment used by the Armed Forces and the 
supply of logistics to them is undertaken by the Defence Equipment and Support organisation 
(DE&S), which is an integral part of the MoD. Importantly, the DE&S appeared to be 
insufficient within aligning the UK's defence acquisition system with the available financial 
resources and the armed forces' operational requirements, as well as it certainly lacks 
commercial skills to deliver expected outcomes. The numerous initiatives have been undertaking 
in attempt to reform defence procurement/acquisition, including Smart Procurement, Smart 
Acquisition, the Defence Acquisition Change Programme and the Defence Acquisition Reform 
Programme. However, they had only moderate success as there still exist major cost and time 
overruns in defence acquisition, with the average being a 40 per cent increase in the projected 
cost and an 80 per cent increase in the time taken to enter into service.
213
  
7.4. DEFENCE INDUSTRY 
The British defense industry is by far the most competitive European player on the 
international arms market, thus, it is less dependent on European arrangements or state support. 
The policy of detachment is more feasible within the UK DTIB than, for example, in France.  
Moreover, British defence industry has been restructuring itself substantially in order to lower 
spendings. It has been pursuing various diversification strategies. The defence industry operates 
within the expanding security sector where dual use civilian and military technologies can be 
reengineered for specific usages. Another approach to diversification has been to concentrate on 
service provision through ‘through-life’ approach, which implies readiness and sustainment 
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Despite budgetary pressures, the UK Government remains a major customer, retaining a defence 
budget that is the fourth largest in the world, spending around £166bn over the next ten years on 
equipment and support.
215
 Additionally, the part of the Government’s wider agenda for export-
led growth, it is to support appropriate defence exports by exploring how the capability needs of 
both the UK and overseas customers can be meet. Consequently, Britain accelerate its arms 
export over past years, it rose up in arm export ranking by three points from 2010 and fall one 
point in 2016.  The U.K. is among five biggest arms sellers in the world. According to HIS Janes 
repost, U.K. arms export worth $4,380 million in 2016.
216
 
The prime manufacturer BAE System, a British global defence, aerospace and security company, 
has already assured that it is less reliant on its UK customer base. BAE's business segments 
include Electronic Systems, Cyber & Intelligence and Platforms & Services. It supports major 
defence projects such as the F-35 Lightning II, Eurofighter Typhoon, Astute-class submarines 
and the Queen Elizabeth-Class aircraft carriers .BAE System reported revenues of £18,180m for 
the 2013 with operational profit of £806m.
217
 Additionally, the company is less reliant on the 
national customer as it has already developed greater diversity in its market structure. It pursues 
the strategy of its ‘home markets’ through inward industrial investment and military sales to the 
six countries: the United States, the UK, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Australia and Sweden. This 
provides BAE Systems with additional financial resources and diversity. Moreover, as the U.K. 
chose to open up the capital of defence contractors for the investments, the British defence 
companies’ shares by multiple private investors. (See table 14) 
Table 14: Capital Structure of defence companies in the U.K. 
 Public Private Number of 
shareholders 
Majority investor Shares owned 
Babcock 
International 
 100% - The Capital Group 
Companies 
6.05% 
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BAE Systems  100% - Invesco Asset 
Management 
13% 
Cobham  100% - Shroders 5.22% 
Meggit  100% - Capital Research and 
Management Cies 
11.67% 
QinetiQ  100% - Ruane Cunif 9.7% 
Smith Group  100% - Harris Associates 5.3% 
Rolls-Royce  100% - Invesco Asset Managment 4.58% 
Source: Matelly et all (2016) 
However, British approach towards promoting arms export to the non-EU and non-
NATO states has been highly critised by international community lately. In 2013 the British 
Government has issued more than 3,000 export licenses for military and intelligence equipment 
worth a total of £12.3bn to countries which are on its own official list for human rights abuse. 
Frankly, only two states of 27 on the Foreign Office’s human rights list – North Korea and South 
Sudan –haven’t been mentioned in arms export report. Among the others, Saudi Arabia has 417 
licenses with a value of £1.8bn; Pakistan 219 worth almost £50m; Sri Lanka 49 at £8m and 
Zimbabwe 46, worth just under £3m.
218
 Therefore, it is expected U.K. to reconsider its export 
policy in upcoming years.  
7.5. DEFENCE COOPERATION AND POOLING AND SHARING OPTIONS 
NSS and SDSR acknowledge the need for more international cooperation, due to the cuts 
in resources and capabilities. However, U.K. frustration with CSDP is probably the strongest 
among EU’s major powers. Even before Libya, most British politicians and military generals had 
concluded that many EU member states would never become credible military partners and that 
CSDP was therefore not worth their time. Amongst other things, the UK stressed out that the 
EDA is insufficient and money wasteful. Consequently, Britain had also significantly cut back its 
contributions to many CSDP military and civilian deployments. Currently, preferred partners are 
the US and France and to a lesser extent Denmark, Estonia, Norway, Turkey and the 
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Netherlands. In addition, the UK has a strong preference for working with them bilaterally as 
large multinational initiatives are too expensive and problematic.
219
 
Hence, the Franco-British defence accords signed in November 2010 are only a logical 
consequence of countries’ growing frustration with EU member states reluctance to contribute 
resources and capabilities into CSDP missions. Among other factors that make the Franco-
British defence cooperation possible is that both countries are major military powers within EU, 
both are willing to undertake pro-active actions overseas and have similar strategic interests in 
different parts of world. Besides above, the coalition government shows growing hostility 
towards EDA-led pooling and sharing initiatives and procurement policies. The Tory party 
leader and MP Cameron made clear that it will not invest in EU-based initiatives.  It underlines 
its NATO- first policy.
220
  
7.6. APPROACH TO CSDP 
The U.K. has been a leading player in European Defence. The British Government has 
supported EU defence integration project from the 1998 St. Malo Agreement through to the 
negotiation of the Helsinki goals and the multiple initiatives and projects on capability building 
that followed, to promote effective and shared European defence capabilities. Britain’s 
perception of the value of a militarily autonomous CSDP is one of the limited scope of crisis 
management operations, particularly those outlined in ‘Petersberg tasks’.
221
 Consistent with this 
vision, the CSDP main role is seen within soft power dimensions of security, such as conflict 
prevention, stabilization and civil-military tasks which required a comprehensive approach.
222
 
Therefore, UK is reluctant to develop common high-end capabilities, such as EU operational 
headquarters, as long as NATO provides necessary planning structures, procedures and resources 
for pro-active robust military operations.  
The 2010 SDSR had not changed the approach to CSDP, it links the future role of CSDP to the 
promotion of stability, the engagement in conflict prevention tasks, the support to integrated 
missions and military tasks where NATO does not contribute and where action through the EU 
can provide good value for money (e.g. counter-piracy efforts in Somalia, Operation 
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 Despite an ambiguous understanding of CDSP role addressed by the British 
government, the British path towards European defence has been backwards over last couple 
years. Britain has preferred bilateral cooperation with France (e.g. the Franco-British defence 
agreement) rather than multilateral initiatives within the EU framework, for instance regarding 
pooling and sharing or military engagements. 
Britain’s has a comprehensive strategic approach across every security matter, from home affairs 
and development aid to issues of military power projection and international trade. U.K. 
perceived itself as global hub or powerful actor in international relations, whose power, energy 
and ability to preserve its influence on the global stage, goes beyond the limits imposed by 
geography, population and means. These core elements of the nation’s ambition to think and act 
globally relate to the imperial heritage and necessity to response to the pressures imposed by 
globalised international structure. In this regard, the U.K. core strategic interests lies within 
maintaining and development relations with NATO allies and particularly the U.S. The special 
relations with the U.S. have been fostered by the compatibility of the two armies, which have 
shared similar equipment, joint training programmes and intelligence.
224
 Concerning the 
willingness to project hard power means in overseas engagements, Britain has been constantly 
involved in large-scale and intensity military and civil operations. However, as it was outlined 
earlier, due to the budgetary constraints and existing capability gaps from 2010 U.K. has been 
more selective in its future deployments as well as in multilateral defence cooperation projects. 
This means, the government coalition decision-making process is characterized by value-based 
vision towards pursuing its National Security Strategy, with preference given to bilateral 
agreements, such as Franco-British defence cooperation, rather ineffective and costly multilateral 
arrangements (e.g. A440M project).
225
 
Despite growing negative perception of British politician on future developments within CSDP, 
the U.K. has been an active actor and contributor to the various military operations launched by 
EU. Between 2004 and 2010, the UK has been ranked fifth among the top ten contributors to 
military operations under the CSDP framework, with its contribution of 7.8 percent (of the total 
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EU), only below France and Germany.
226
 However, growing disappointment with EU missions’ 
implementation and outcomes (especially after Libya and Mali), lack of fundings, insufficiency 
in EU decision-making system as well as controversial strategic cultures of the member states, 
all these along with rising budgetary crisis in U.K. make the coalition government to question the 
rationale behind further empowerment of the CSDP. 
The growing prostrations and concerns over EU cooperation in defence and security were 
reflected in the outcome of the referendum in June 2016, when the U.K. favored to leave the EU. 
As under CSDP institutional framework, the member states contribute to the military operations 
on case-by-case basis, rather than EU holds its own military assets, it is possible to argue that the 
U.K. leaving the EU will have greater impact on European military capabilities rather than on 
British ones. The House of Common Library noted: 
“In terms of military power and projection, therefore, the UK’s withdrawal is more likely 
to place the EU at a disadvantage, with fewer assets and capabilities at its disposal. This is 
particularly true of certain strategic assets such as tactical airlift and intelligence, surveillance 
and reconnaissance assets. From the UK’s standpoint, its ability to project military power would 
be largely unaffected, and any military shortfalls could be compensated for through bilateral 





The reduction of the armed forces has a significant impact on Britain’s ability to project 
and sustain military power across the globe. The SDSR 2010 and later the SDSR 2015 has 
lowered the level of ambition for the armed forces significantly. While preserving what might be 
described as a competent in form of its armored brigades, the army ultimately is reduced to 
missions that require, at most, a brigade with some additional service and a greater support from 
the allies.  
The British Army is in the bad shape, while being a subject to increasing budget cuts it 
was struggling to sustain operations in Afghanistan. In a sense, the British military as a whole 
mortgaged its future to pay for the military engagements overseas. Consequently, the British 
MoD has decided that the best possible way to meet future exigencies in spite of greatly reduced 
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numbers of military personnel is to divide the army in consideration of armed forces’ 
specialization and tiered readiness with a greater reliance on reserves. The UK is gambling not to 
have enough trained armed forces to mount large-scale military operations independently. 
Moreover, U.K. has intended to maintain as much of the spectrum of capabilities as possible. 
While it has been reconsidering major defence acquisition projects U.K. has been able to 
provides fund for modernization of its medium-weight vehicles. However, the analysis of British 
public procurement reveals that the Royal navy and air force has been a subject to drastic 
budgetary cuts, which left U.K. without advanced aircraft carriers for a decade. Particularly, to 
date British armed forces doesn’t have any aircrafts capable of short take-off and vertical 
landing, as well as it has no operation aircraft carrier to deliver these planes to the point of final 
destination. Therefore, it is questionable whether U.K. armed force will be able to cope with 
ambitious tasks set out in the National Security Strategy.  
However, the decrease in domestic procurement orders hasn’t affected the defense industry as 
tremendously as it did in other EU states. As the U.K. defence industry has been widely open for 
the international market and largely privatized, it has been able to overcome national budget 














8.  CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN DEFENCE COOPERATION. CONCLUSIVE 
REMARKS 
The austerity measures and structural changes imposed by the governments have forced 
Europe’s three largest and most capable militaries to struggle in finding ways to maintain their 
commitment to the full spectrum of responsibilities while compromising on size and 
sustainability. Maintaining the defence industry delivering full spectrum of capabilities has 
arguably become more of an aspiration than a reality. British, French, and German armed forces 
have been obliged to make certain compromises based on their assessment of competing 
priorities and risk analysis.  
The underlined policies of the British, German and French governments in response to changing 
security environments have multiple implications for the European Defence.  As Germany, 
France and U.K. are major military powers, contributors and guarantors to the European security, 
the state and capacity of their DTIBs directly affect the whole EU capability to position itself as 
credible global player, which is able to cope with various threats to international peace and 
security. Although the ways the British, French and German MoDs undergone defence industry 
structural changes not necessary reflect military developments within other EU member states, 
however, it is possible to argue that at least to a certain extent they determines the features of the 
national and European DTIBs patterns in times of austerity. 
Not only Germany, France and U.K. have been going through major budget cuts recently but 
every EU member state has been facing similar challenge to a certain extent. EU countries have 
been forced to reassess and reduce their defence spending. With the public debt and economic 
growth projected to stagnate, the pressure on national government has increased. So far, 
following the common pattern every EU member state has undertaken an effort to reconsider 
layoffs and termination of contracts, programmes and operations, risking credibility of its forces. 
National DTIBs have been affected by the austerity measures imposed by the governments in 
numerous European countries likewise U.K., Germany and France, which have been coping with 
the luck of resources. Initially many governments attempt to accumulate savings through 
elimination of some of their outdated military equipment. France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom has planned scaling back major procurement and 
modernization programs, such as the A400M aircraft, NH90 helicopters and Typhoon fighter 
jets. However, many of these plans have been revised when governments started to face the large 
financial penalties from the supply side on canceling programs. As a result, many of the 
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introduced equipment cuts have not been driven solely by operational needs or by proper cost-
benefit calculation. 
Nearly every national project on acquisition of equipment is delayed. Denmark has notably 
postponed the decision on how to replace its F-16 fighter aircraft. Many countries are scaling 
down their initial orders. Most large countries and several medium sized ones are retiring their 
assets earlier – including Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and the U.K. And 
few countries has been trying to re-sell their equipment to other countries, the good example is 
Germany’s intention to re-sell the tranche of the Eurofighter jet. Several states, with prominent 
example of the UK and Germany policy in regards of arms export, have preferred to keep 
building equipment and then export it to the non-EU and non-NATO s rather than trigger job 
losses within their industrial sector. 
8.1. NATIONAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Although many governments have acknowledged the advantages of closer defence 
cooperation that could at least partially offset the impact of recent drastic budget cuts, the little 
progress has been made over last decade if any at all. The member states have been struggling to 
push forward defence cooperation under CSDP framework. In the course of economic crisis 
member states reconsidered and recalculated its defence expenditure, however they did so along 
the national lines. Despite growing budgetary pressures on national armies, majority of defence 
funds was spent by individual governments on building national forces and equipping them, 
mostly with weapons manufactured within the state. It appears that the ministries have little 
consideration for their neighbors’ acquisition projects, which could be complementing to 
national military needs. As well as there is very little concern among the states over the shortfalls 
other EU militaries might struggle with or  opportunities for future collaboration. In overall, the 
stance of European defence is characterized by wasteful way to build and maintain national 
armed forces which suffer from chronic lack of cooperation and consequently, capability gaps, 
waste of fundings, duplication of equipment and assets. This especially makes the case in light of 
budgetary crisis as EU countries with 28 different governments managing, equipping and 
commanding 28 armies cannot benefit from shared costs programmes. They spend too much on 
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Despite sign of hope among EU decision-makers, the financial pressure on national public 
budgets has not led to fundamental reconsideration of the current state of the defence integration 
in the EU.  Even recent developments in sharing and pooling capabilities and bilateral defence 
cooperation, such as Franco-German and Franco-British agreements, cannot sustain the illusion 
of a common security and defence policy. All these initiatives are oriented towards fulfillment of 
capability gap, saving money and rationalizing of national DTIBs, however, they all lack a 
guiding European perspective. Altogether nearly ever initiative on defence cooperation proved to 
be dysfunctional due to the same reasons the CDSP is. 
8.2. THE SOVEREIGNTY PROBLEM WITHIN EUROPEAN DEFENCE 
Along with economic crisis there is evolving crisis in the European Institutions. Both of 
them are driven by the same dilemma: common instruments tend to fail if common responsibility 
is no assumed. Thus, the traditional concept of national sovereignty arises. The governments are 
highly reluctant to share the authority over military matters due to the lack of trust, uncertainty 
on partners’ intentions and commitments, different strategic interests and cultures, as well as 
fears of entrapment and/or abandonment. Through analysing institutional framework and legal 
underpinning of the European defence integration, it is possible to argue that efforts that have 
been made towards enhancing defence cooperation are rather symbolic and they barely interfere 
with the core of national defence policy sovereignty. Indeed, member states constantly fail to 
‘pull their weight’ in military affairs best manifested in effort to promote European defence 
integration and cooperation. 
Since 2008, the EU has been decreasing its involvement overseas. No EU Battle Group has ever 
been deployed. As it was demonstrated during the operations in Libya, European forces remain 
not only heavily dependent on U.S. air assets but also tend to act unilaterally in order to pursue 
its strategic interests. Moreover, the inability of the CSDP to respond comprehensively to 
conflict in Libya and its underwhelming performance in Mali, all these question EU’s effort to 
become a credible foreign policy actor capable to perform full spectrum of military tasks. The 
fact that these two crises were in Europe’s neighborhood with humanitarian and strategic 
components at stake, and the U.S. had stated it preference for Europeans to undertake crisis-
management operations, makes the CSDP’s shortcomings even more explicit. The case of Libya 
in particular, where both the UN and the Arab League had demanded an intervention, revealed 
European community  incompetence to undertake necessary actions in a scenario that met all the 
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criteria that are ideally required to trigger CSDP action.
229
 Moreover, due to the budgetary cuts 
some member states found it hard to continue supporting the ongoing missions, so that the EU 
struggled to sustain its peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and anti-piracy patrols. Although similar 
issues to those underlined above has existed  within the CSDP prior current budgetary crisis, the 
economic austerity only deepen already existing crisis of lack of political will and commitment 
to develop defence cooperation. 
Consequently, the CSDP’s poor performance in military engagements, failure of major 
multinational procurement projects, the fiasco in merging EADS/BAE, all these increased further 
political frictions at the heart of Europe. EU major military powers have been growing 
increasingly disillusioned with EU efforts to sustain necessary capabilities to cope with stated 
objectives. Probably, the most vocal example is U.K., which first significantly reduced its 
contributions to the CSDP and its instruments and later left the EU all together. 
The debt crisis widened the differences among member countries and weakened the EU’s 
cohesion. So the CSDP becoming more like a ‘self-help’ system where member states are highly 
reluctant to cooperate in military and industrial matters. Moreover, the way they cope with 
budgetary constraints while maintaining military capacity is primarily base on consideration of 
national interests, industry and resources. Moreover, the states often chose to act unilaterally 
putting national strategic interests over European ones. 
8.3. THEORETICAL APPLICATION 
Through the analysis of EU member states’ defence policies and spending trends in light 
of economic stagnation, it is possible to argue that area of defence cooperation remains highly 
intergovernmental. Moreover, the examination of legal limitations of the CSDP in the third 
chapter of the thesis, provide evidence that there is the lack of political will among member 
states. To date, they have failed to generate concrete cooperative initiatives that will initiate a 
transition from ‘defence policy’ to ‘defence’.  Therefore, the author argues that Constructivist 
assumptions on development of European defence cooperation, its triggers and its future 
implications are disputable. The empirical analysis highlights that EU member states not just 
reluctant to cooperate in military matters but strongly oppose any cooperative initiatives, which 
implies any loss of sovereignty over national military affairs. Moreover, the author points out 
that during last decade EU member states have not allocated any authority to the EU in the field 
of defence. The CSDP has not evolved into a ‘supranational’ institution but quite the opposite. 
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The case studies of Germany, France and U.K. highlighted set of challenges the national MoD 
has been going through in order to cope with budgetary and structural constraints. Their response 
to economic crisis has been done in similar manner with prime focus on national military needs 
and strategic interests. The states has been restructuring the armed forces with afford to 
maximise and rationalize their military capacity while reducing costs. Moreover, numerous 
failures of pooling and sharing initiatives and common defence procurement projects, inability of 
EU to respond collectively to the crises overseas, fundamental differences between strategic 
cultures of certain states have led to total disillusion within CSDP. Consequently the first steps 
of disintegration from defence cooperation projects appeared. 
The author argues, that dynamics of interrelations among Germany, France and U.K. themselves 
and in regards to the defence integration can be best understood through prism of Neorealist 
theory. The Neorealist concept of ‘alliance security dilemma’ provides convenient explanation of 
reasons pooling and sharing initiatives have so little success. As the states fear the abandonment 
and/or entrapment by the possible partners, they tend to rely on themselves. For example, 
Germany and France have been trapped in ‘alliance security dilemma’ as their defence 
cooperation failed to deliver positive outcomes. The different strategic cultures and perception 
on the role of the CSDP make any pooling and sharing projects nearly impossible. One of the 
factors that limits possibility of the military cooperation between the states is that French 
government is afraid to lose control over military assets as it is uncertain whether Germany will 
fulfill its contractual obligation, as well as it fears that it will not be possible to use common 
assets when they are needed. From the other side, Germany struggle with similar dilemmas that 
also include fear of entrapment: that if the state merges a portion of its armed forces with France, 
it will be pressured to join a mission because France wishes to take part.  Among others the 
Libya experience that was mentioned before, has highlighted crucial differences of the states’ 
opinions in military matters. In the words of François Heisbourg: “[f]rom the eurozone crisis to 
intervention in Libya and Mali, and the failed merger of EADS and BAE Systems, the 
differences and tensions between Paris and Berlin are palpable”.
230
 
As Neorealist approach is systematic, it argues states defence policy is better explained through 
power distribution in international system, so every unit act in consideration of type of power 
formation. For instance, due to the severe restructuring, the size of British military has been 
significantly cut with loss of aircraft lift at least till the end of decade. Therefore, the British 
government has stressed its willingness to intensify military cooperation with France, as they 
both have relatively similar strategic interests, military power and degree of willingness to use 
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that power.  Therefore, from the Neorealist point of view, the bilateral cooperation became 
possible as both states have believed that it will maximise states’ security and military powers. 
Another prominent verification for the Neorealist thought is the U.K.’s decision to exit the 
European Union. The British disintegration is in direct accordance with a realist assumption, that 
international institutions and the EU itself are very fragile. So other various forces, such as desire 
of autonomy or national sovereignty are extremely influential in state affairs. Unlike liberal 
theories, that manifest the role of institutions in ensuring the cooperation between states through 
mixture of shared values, norms and rules, thus changing states’ behavioral patterns, Realists 
emphasize the role of national states. Realist argue that the international institutions are very 
limited in their competence, possessed no real coercive power over member states. So the state, 
in this case the U.K., chooses to act as it wishes in entering and/or leavening international 
projects. As the U.K. has grown greatly prostrated and distant with the EU ‘common’ policies, 
especially in regards to defence policy, it was not a surprise to realists it chose to disintegrate 
rather a prominent prove that integration is limited to states desires to rise their relative and/or 
absolute power.
231
     
Moreover, the analysis of national defence policies and capabilities suggest that European major 
military powers have been favoring NATO defence cooperation framework rather than CSDP. 
Therefore it is possible to conclude that to date, the EU still relies on national DTIBs and NATO 
with regard on capability delivering and force generation initiatives. With the absence of any 
significant improvements within the defence integration under the European framework and due 
to the military capability cuts on national level, it is possible to argue that the member states 
within EU continues  bandwagoning on U.S. power, as it was described by the Neorealism. The 
presence of the alliance security dilemma, coupled with defence retrenchment and differentiation 
in the balance of threat among European major military powers, will make it very difficult for 
pooling and sharing initiatives to develop through CSDP. European defence cooperation is 
therefore most likely to remain bilateral and sub-regional and limited in scope and depth. 
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9. DISSERTATION’S CONCLUSION 
Since the end of the Cold War, the architecture of European Defence has undergone 
significant transformation. Under the dilemma of increasing production costs and decreasing 
budgetary assets, European Defence Industrial Base was forced to restructure and consolidate. In 
order to maintain competitive national defence industries, European states have been developing 
various policies in regard to public procurement, defence market and R&D. While legally it has 
been a prerogative of national states to regulate restructuring and consolidation of European 
defence industry, it is impossible to separate involvement and influence of other defence actors, 
such as international institutions and non-state actors like the defence firms, on the process.  
Despite geopolitical, technological, economic and financial pressures that pushed national 
defence industries to the path of integration and globalization, in many terms defence remained a 
national state matter. As national governments have always played a crucial role in defence 
industry, acting as a customer, regulator and financier, the process of EDTIB development have 
been guided primarily by them. Although states have chosen various direction in developing 
state-industry relationship, the main objective to every was to develop self-sufficient defence 
industrial base that is able to survive and advance in extremely competitive defence market. 
Although during the Cold War, the major military powers of the EU (namely, France, Germany 
and the U.K.) had very similar positions and structure of DTIBs, where states were largely 
involved in the organization of the defence sector as the client who determined the way military 
programmes were developed and financed, in aftermath of the Cold War it changed notably.
 232
 
Each of these three states have chosen different path in developing state-industry relationship: 
the U.K. adopted the liberal model favoring open and competitive market; Germany decided to 
distance itself from its defence industry; France chose to preserve its military autonomy despite 
budgetary pressures.
233
 Although, these led to different defence industry configurations within 
the EU, the national defence policy still shares similar pattern. 
For instance, under the budgetary pressures Germany, France and the U.K. have encouraged 
export-oriented defence policy while favoring national contractors in public defence 
procurement projects. Moreover, despite recent financial and economic crisis in the EU, the 
states have been focused on streamlining national defence sector and armed forces along its 
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national lines rather than relay on international partners. The study discovered, that despite 
governments’ acknowledge of possible advantages of closer defence cooperation, that could at 
least partially offset the impact of decreasing budgets, the little progress has been made within 
the European framework over last decade if any at all. The member states have been struggling 
to push forward defence cooperation under CSDP framework. Despite growing budgetary 
pressures on national armies, majority of defence funds were spent by individual governments on 




The analysis of institutional and legal instruments for the European defence cooperation suggest 
that states are growingly reluctant to transfer their power in high policy matters into hands of 
supranational entities.  The nature of instruments is self-explanatory in its limitation: there are no 
really coercive powers to any international defence institution, as well as established norms and 
procedures are non-binding. 
Thereof, the analysis of European defense industry configuration and dynamics in aftermath of 
the Cold War and with regards to economic and financial crisis in the EU delivers two main 
conclusions. First, budget constrains have downgraded nearly all European defense capabilities. 
Second, the member states are far away from a common defence approach that will cut costs and 
increase effectiveness. Many solutions and tools, which were proposed in order to facilitate 
defence cooperation, such as the Ghent Initiative to the Weimar Triangle, have been neglected. 
In practice, every country tend to plan and act for itself. While, there are numerous national 
defense initiatives and reforms in Europe, there is none of truly European reform. The states are 
trapped in the ‘Alliance Security Dilemma’, which posits that the scope and depth of cooperation 
within alliances and other forms of cross-national defence collaboration is limited by the fear of 
abandonment or entrapment by other participants.
235
 Meanwhile, the US’ shift from Europe to 
Pacafic calls into question Washington’s security commitment to Europe and the EU’s ability to 
pursue its strategic interests on its own.
236
 Thus, unless a greater degree of cooperation and 
common planning develops among at least the major European powers, the national militaries 
are doomed to suffer. 
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The end of the Cold War has marked the shift in bipolar world order. Changing geopolitical, 
economic and social environments, as well as rapid technological progress, have led to deep 
restructure of defence entities in Europe. The process of gradual national defence industries 
restructure and consolidation has been spreading across European borders, affecting every 
defence industrial sector. Thereof, this thesis aims to analyse the process of European Defence 
Industry’s restructuring and integration process. It scrutinizes the process in terms of the 
European Defence Industrial Base on the one side and international integration efforts on the 
other. It investigates drivers of change for the defence industry, particularly: decreasing budgets, 
changing relationship between state and defence industry, advancement of technological 
innovations, importance of civil sector and internationalization of national defence companies. 
Regarding the restructuring process, the thesis examines National Defence Policies of Germany, 
France and the United Kingdom towards their respective National Defence Technology 
Industrial Bases along with the applications of these policies on the defence integration process 
within the EU. 
Key words: Defence industry, European Defence Industrial Base, Defence Integration, 
Restructuring, Germany, France, the United Kingdom. 
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Konec studené války znamenal posun v bipolárním uspořádání světa. Změny geopolitického, 
hospodářského a sociálního prostředí a rychlý technologický pokrok vedly k hluboké 
restrukturalizaci obraných struktur v Evropě. Proces restrukturalizace a konsolidace národního 
obranného průmyslu se rozšiřuje napříč Evropou a ovlivňuje každý sektor obranného průmyslu. 
Cílem dizertační práce je analyzovat proces restrukturalizace a integrace evropského obranného 
průmyslu. Práce nahlíží na proces z hlediska evropské obranné průmyslové základny na straně 
jedné a úsilí o mezinárodní integraci na straně druhé. Zkoumá hnací síly změn v obranném 
průmyslu, zejména: klesající rozpočty, měnící se vztahy mezi státem a obranným průmyslem, 
rozvoj technologických inovací, význam civilního sektoru a internacionalizace národních 
obranných společností. S ohledem na proces restrukturalizace dizertace zkoumá národní obranné 
politiky Německa, Francie a Spojeného království ve vztahu k jejich národní obranné 
technologické a průmyslové základně spolu s aplikací těchto politik na obranný integrační proces 
v rámci EU.  
Klíčová slova: obranný průmysl, evropská obranná průmyslová základna, obranná integrace, 















Bialos, Jeffrey P., Christine E. Fisher, Stuart Koehl, and Christer Lennart Mossberg. Fortresses and 
icebergs: the evolution of the transatlantic defense market and the implications for U.S. national 
security policy. Washington, D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, Paul H. Nitze School of 
Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 2009 
Jauhiainen,Jussi S., Luc Mampaey. Post-cold war conversion in Europe: defence restructuring in the 
1990s and the regional dimension, LES RAPPORTS DU GRIP : 1999 
Haas, Ernst B. 1958. The uniting of Europe: political, social, and economic forces, 1950-1957. 
Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press 
Hartley, Keith. “The Arms Industry, Procurement and Industrial Policies”, Chapter 33 in Handbook of 
Defense Economics, Volume 2, edited by Sandler and Hartley, 2007 
Hebert, J. La transformation du systиme franзais de production d’armement : une vue d’ensemble, in 
Hebert, J., Pascallon, P. (eds), La politique industrielle d’armement et de dйfense de la Vиme 
Rйpublique. Evolution, bilan et perspectives, Paris, L’Harmattan. 2010 
 Howorth, Joulon. Security and Defence Policy in the European Union. London & New York: 
Palgrave, 2007 
Hyde-Price, Adrian,  European Security in the Twenty-First Century: The Challenge of Multipolarity. 
London: Routledge, 2007 
Lember, M. Introduction, in Lember et al. (eds), Public Procurement, Innovation and Policy, Berlin, 
Springer-Verlag., 2014 
Mayer, Hartmut and Henri Vogt (Ed.)  A Responsible Europe? . Palgrave Macmillan, August 2004.  
Mearsheimer, Jon J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton,  2001 
Minuz, Manuel. “France: The Frustrated Leader” in National Vision of EU Defence Policy: Common 
Denominators and Misunderstandings, edited by Federico Santopinto and Megan Price, 6-26. 
Centre for European Policy Studies, 2013 
 
 Morgenthau, Hans. Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace. brief edition, revised 
by Kenneth Thompson, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993 
 
Porter, M. E. The Competitive Advantage of Nations. New York: Free Press, 1990. 
 
Waltz, Kenneth. Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley, 1979 
 
Whitman, Richard G. and Manners, I. The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States. 
Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2000. 
Wurzer, Christian. “A German vision of CSDP: “It’s taking part that counts” in National Vision of EU 
Defence Policy: Common Denominators and Misunderstandings, edited by Federico Santopinto 




ARTICLES AND ANALYSIS PAPERS: 
Belin, J., Guille , M. “R&D et innovation en France: Quel financement pour les entreprises de la 
defense”, Innovations, 28, 2008, 
Bickerton, C., Irondelle, B. and Menon, A. “Security Co-operation Beyond the Nation-State: The EU’s 
Common Security and Defence Policy”, Journal for Common Market Studies, vol. 49, no. 1, 
2011. 
Biscop, Sven. “Mediterranean mayhem: lessons for European crisis management”, Egmont Security 
Policy Brief, 19/IV/2011, 2011.  
Carmona, Robert. “Un budget de transition pour la Défense en 2013” [A Transition Budget for 
Defense in 2013], La Tribune No. 313, March 2013. 
Chantrill, Christopher. “Public Spending Details for 2010.” 2010. Available at 
www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/year_spending_2010UKbn_12bc1n_30 
Cooper, I. ‘The euro crisis as the revenge of neo-functionalism’ EU Observer, 2011. 
Cornish, Paul and Geoffrey  Edwards. “Beyond the EU/NATO dichotomy: the beginnings of a 
European strategic culture”. International Affairs ,Volume 77, Issue 3, pages 587–603, July 
2001. 
Cornish, Paul and Andrew M. Dorman, “Fifty shades of purple? A risk-sharing approach to the 2015 
Strategic Defence and Security Review.” International Affairs, Vol. 89 (5), September 2013. 
Cugny,Emmanuel.  “Budget Defense 2014–2019: Les longs soupirs de la Grande mette” [Defense 
Budget 2014–19, The Army’s Big Sigh], November 26, 2013.  
 
Davis, Jan and Robin Dodd. “US ‘Prompt Global Strike’ Capability: A New Destabilising Sub-State 
Deterrent in the Making?”, British American Security Information Council, occasional paper, 
2006. 
 
De La Brosse, Guillaume. “Deploying financial tools in support of European Defence Cooperation”, 




Dupuy, R.” L’industrie europienne de defense : changements institutionnels et strategies de cooptition 
des firmes, dans le dossier Fondements economiques et industriels de la defense”, Innovations, 
42(3), 2013 
 
Drent, Margriet  and Dick Zandee .”European defence: action and commitment”. EU Strategy to 




Dyson, Tom and  Theodore Konstadinides. “Understanding the Limitations of the EU’s Common 
Security and Defence Policy.”  Routledge, 2013 
Edwards, Jay. “The EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive: A Step towards Affordability?” 




Fiott, Daniel. “The Geopolitical Implications of the Eurozone Crisis: The Case of the Common 
Security and Defence Policy.” UACES, 3 September 2012. 
Fontanel, J., Hebert, J. , The End of the “French Grandeur Policy”, Defence and Peace Economics, 
8(1), 1997 
Foucault, Martial. “The Defence Budget in France: Between Denial and Decline”, IFRI, December 
2012. 
Giegerich, Bastian, Alexander Nicoll. “The Struggle for Value in European Defence”, Survival 54: 1, 
2012. 
Giji Gya. ‘The ESS Scorecard’. European Security Review , No 42, ISIS Europe, December 2008.  
Gotkowska, Justyna. “Defence Procurement - A Minefield for Germany's New Defence Minister?” 
Centre for Eastern Studies, February 2014. Available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-
Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=177470  
 Gotkowska, Justina. “New market conditions and “exit strategies” for the German arms industry.” 
Centre for Eastern Studies 130, 2014. Available at 
http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/commentary_130.pdf 
Greco Ettoro, N. Pirozzi, Stefano Silvestri (eds). “EU Crisis Management: Institutions and Capabilities 
in the Making.” IAI, Rome, November 2010. 
Jones, Chris. “United we stand, divided we fall: Supply chain consolidation and the rise of risk-sharing 
partners”. MRO, June 2015.  
Heidenkamp, Henrik. “ Financial Imperatives for Germany's Security and Defence Policy”, RUSI, 
November 2011. Available at 
https://www.rusi.org/go.php?structureID=commentary&ref=C4EB8157BCED94#.U5nyVPl_uS
o  
Heuninckx, Baudouin. “The European Defence Agency Capability Development Plan and the 
European Armaments Cooperation Strategy: Two Steps in the Right Direction.” Public 
Procurement Law Review, Volume 18, Issue 4, Sweet & Maxwell, 2009. Available at 
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/pprg/documentsarchive/fulltextarticles/heuninckxeuropeandefence
agency.pdf 
Keller, Patric. ”German Hard Power: Is There a There There?”, AEI Outlook Series, October 2013.  
Koutrakos, Panos. “The Role of Law in Common Security and Defence Policy: Functions, Limitations 
and Perceptions.” 2011. 
Krahmann, Elke. "Conceptualising Security and Governance." Cooperation and Conflict 38(1), 2003. 
Liberti, Fabio “Defence spending in Europe: Can we do better without spending more?”, Institut 
Jacques Delors, June 2011. 
Luis Simón, “A spider in Europe’s web? French grand strategy from Iraq to Libya.” Geopolitics, 
3/I/2013 
Major, Claudia, Mölling, Christian and Alicia von Voß. “The State of Defence Cooperation in 
Europe.” German Institute for Internationa and Security Affairs, Working Paper, FG 03-WP No 
3, December 2013. 
105 
 
Major, Claudia and Florian Wassenberg. “Warsaw’a Ambitious CSDP Agenda.” German Institute for 
Internationa and Security Affairs, September 2011. Available at http://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2011C25_mjr_wsb_ks.pdf  
Major, Claudia. “France, Germany and European defence: more pragmatism and less pathos, please.” 
Comité d’études des relations franco-allemandes, January 2013. 
Masson, H, La reorganisation de l’industrie de dйfense britannique, Recherche et documents de 
la Fondation pour la recherche stratйgique. 2008 
 
Masson, H., Industrie de defence et soutien public а la R&D en Europe, Recherche et documents de la 
Fondation pour la recherche stratйgique. 2010 
Matelly, Sylvie and Marcos Lima. “The influence of the State on the strategic choices of Defence 
Companies: the cases of Germany, France and the EU after the Cold War”, Journal of 
Innovation Economics and Management, 2016/2 (n°20), p. 61-88. 
Molthof, Mieke. “France: The Disillusioned Leader of l’Europe de la Défense.” November 2013. 
Available at http://studentthinktank.eu/blogs/france-the-disillusioned-leader-of-leurope-de-la-
defense/ 
O’Donnel Clara M. (Ed.). “The Implications of Military Spending Cuts for NATO’s Largest 
Members.” Brookings Analysis Paper, 2012. Available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/7/military%20spending%20nato%
20odonnell/military%20spending%20nato%20odonnell%20pdf.pdf   
Oakeshott, Michael. “The Moral Life in the Writings of Thomas Hobbes”, Rationalism in Politics and 
Other Essays, 1960. 
Oakeshott, Michael . ‘On Being Conservative’, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, 1991.   
Olsen, J. P. “The Many Faces of Europeanization.” Oslo, ARENA, Centre for European  Studies 
Working Papers No.1. 2002.  
Pinar, Elmanand and Marcin Terlikowski. “Balancing Austerity with Ambitions: The (Close) Future of 
French Defence Policy.” The Polish Institute of International Affairs, January 2013.   
Posen, Barry. “ESDP and the Structure of World Power.” The International Spectator, vol. 39, no. 1, 
2004  
Rynning,Sten. “Return of the Jedi: Realism and the Study of the European Union”, Politique 
européenne, no. 17, Autumn 2005.  
Savkovic. Marco. “Europe's Defence in Times of Austerity: Spending Cuts as a One-Way Street?” 
BCSP, October 2012. 
Schweller,Randall L. “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In.” International 
Security 19:1, 1994. 
Shurkin, Michael “Setting Priorities in the Age of Austerity: British, French, and German 
Experiences.” RAND Corporation, RR-222, 2013.  
Taylor, Trevor and Heidenkamp, Henrik et al. “The Defence Industrial Triptych : Government as 
Customer, Sponsor and Regulator” Routledge Journals, 2013 




Valasek, Tomas. “Surviving austerity: The case for a new approach to EU military collaboration”, 
Centre for European Reform, 2011 
Violakis, Petros. “Europeanisation of the EU defence and security policy after the end of the Cold-
War”, University of Exeter, 2016 
Walasek, Tomas. “Surviving Austerity: The case for a new approach to EU military collaboration.” 
Centre for European Reform, 2011. Available at 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR222/RAND_RR222.pdf  
Waltz, Kenneth. “The Emerging Structure of International Politics.” International Security, vol. 18, 
no. 2, Fall 1993. 
Webber, Mark,Stuart Croft, Terry Terriff and Elke Krahman, “The Governance of European Security.” 
Review of International Studies, vol. 30, no. 1, January 2004.  
 Wohlforth, William. “The Russian-Soviet Empire: A Test of Neorealism.” Review of International 
Studies, vol. 27, December 2001. 
 
OFFICIAL REPORTS: 
BAE Systems, Annual Report 2013, London, 2014. Available at: http://bae-systems-investor-relations-
v2.production.investis.com/~/media/Files/B/BAE-Systems-Investor-Relations-
V2/Annual%20Reports/BAE-annual-report-2013.pdf  
Bekkers, F. et al. Development of a European Defence Technological and Industrial Base. Main 
report. TNO, 2009. 
Ballester, Blanca. Cost of Non-Europe Report: European Common  Security and Defence Policy. 
EPRS CoNE 4/2013, Brussels, 2013. 
Brooke-Holland, Louisa and Tom Rutherford. Army 2020. House of Commons Library. London, 
United Kingdom, July 2012. 
Briani, Valerio and Marrone, Alessandro, et al. The Development of a European Defence 
Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). Directorate-General for External Policies of the 
Union, June 2013 
Brune, Sophie-Charlotte, and Christian Molling. The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European 
Defence. European Parliament, Directorate General for External Policies, 2011. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201106/20110623ATT22406/20110623
ATT22406EN.pdf   
Council of European Union. Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council on 
Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence. Annex I to Annex IV, 
Helsinki, 10-11 December 1999. 
 
Council of the European Union. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on transposition of directive 2009/81/EC on Defence and Security Procurement. 2009. 
 
The Defence Committee. Seventh Report of Session 2013–14: Towards the next Defence and Security 
Review. Part One , Paragraph 12, January 7, 2014. 
107 
 
European Defence Agency. Defence Data 2012. Brussels, 2013. Available at: 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-publications/defence-data-booklet-2012-web 
European Commission.  European Defence Action Plan: Towards a European Defence Fund. 
Brussels, November 30, 2016. 
European Commission -press release, A new deal for European Defence: towards a more competitive 
and efficient defence and security sector.Brussels, 2013 
French Senate, Rapport D’Information N°680. [Information Report No. 680], July 18, 2012. 
French Senate. Rapport general commission des finance No. 107. 2012. 
Government of France.  LOI no 96-589 du 2 juillet 1996 relative à la programmation militaire pour 
les années 1997 à  2002” [Law No. 96-589 of July 2, 1996, Related to the the Military 
Programming Law for the Years 1997 to 2002]. July 2, 1996.  
 
House of Commons Library, Brexit: Impact Across Policy Areas, 26 August 2016, p 169 
 
Moores, Ben. Balance of Trade: Global Defence Trade Report 2015, IHS Jane’s, April 2015. 
 
Rolls Royce Holding Plc., Annual Report 2016, London, 2016. Available at https://www.rolls-
royce.com/~/media/Files/R/Rolls-Royce/documents/annual-report/rr-2016-full-annual-report.pdf 
 
SIPRI. Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2016. Stockholm, February 2017 
 
U.K. Ministry of Defence. Better Defence Acquisition: Improving how we procure and support 
Defence equipment. June 2013. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/206032/20130610
_WP_Better_Def_Acquisition_screen_final.pdf  
U.K. Ministry of Defence. Statistical Series 2 – Personnel Bulletin 2.03 – Service & Civilian 
Personnel 2013. 26 September 2013. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/280155/2013.pdf  
UK National Audit Office.  Ministry of Defence:  The Major Projects Report 2011. London, 2011. 
  




OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS AND POLICY PAPERS: 
 
Adam, Patricia. LArmée de Terre ne Dispose Plus Totalement des Ressources Nécessaires à Une 
Préparation Opérationnelle de Qualité, in Ract-Madoux’s Audition to Parliament, available at 
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/cr-cdef/11-12/c1112007.asp#P6_477 
 
Bekker, Sonja, and Ton Wilthagen. Europe's pathways to flexicurity: Lessons presented from and to 
the Netherlands. 2008. 
 
British Ministry of Defence. Building Stability Overseas Strategy, UK Department for International 




British Ministry of Defence, Statistical Series 2 – Personnel Bulletin 2.03 – Service & Civilian 
Personnel 2013, 26 September 2013. 
 
Council of the European Union. A secure Europe in a better world - European security strategy. 
Brussels, 12 December 2003  
 
Council of the European Union. European Security and Defence Policy : Development of European 
Military Capabilities. 2008.  
 
Council of the European Union. Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities. 11 December 2008. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP. OJL 245/17, 2004.  
 
European Commission. Communication towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security 
sector. SWD, 2013. 
 
European Commission. Report on transposition of Directive 2009/43/EC simplifying terms and 
conditions for transfer of defence-related products within the EU. COM/2012/0359 final, 2012.  
 
European Council declaration on strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and 
Defence, Cologne European Council, 1999. 
 
The European Council. Helsinki Headline Goal 2010. 17 and 18 June 2004.  
 
European Defence Agency. An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and 
Capacity Needs. October 2006.  
 
European Parliament and Council. Directive 2009/43/EC: simplifying terms and conditions of transfers 
of defence-related products within the Community. 6 May 2009  
 
European Union, Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text), July 29, 1992, O.J. C 191/1.  
 
European Union. Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version). Treaty of Amsterdam, 2 October 
1997. 
 
European Union, Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, 13 December 2007.  
 
Federal Ministry of Defence, Ressortbericht zum Stand der Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr, 
[Interagency Report on the State of the Reorientation of the Bundeswehr], Bundesministerium 
der Verteidigung, May 8, 2013. 
 
Federal Ministry of Defence, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie, 
Rüstungsexportbericht 2005–2012, [Ministry for Economy and Technology, arms-exports-report 
2005-2012], 2013. 
 
Federal Ministry of Defence, Konzentration und Verantwortung: Die Prozessorientierte 
Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr, [ Concentration and responsibility : The process-oriented 
realignement of the Bundeswehr]. 2011. 
 
French Ministry of Defence. The French White Paper on Defence and National Security 2008, Odile 
Jacob Publishing Corporation, New York, 2008. 
109 
 
French Ministry of Defence. Programme Loi de Programmation Militaire, [military planning law 
2014-2019]. May 2013.    
 
French Ministry of Defence, Projet de loi relatif à la programmation militaire pour les années 2009 à 
2014 et portant diverses dispositions concernant la défense [Draft military planning law 2009–
2014 and diverse defence measures], 2008. 
 
French Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Defense budget guidelines for 2011-2013, Paris, July 7, 2010. 
http://ambafrance-us.org/spip.php?article1751  
 
French Ministry of Defence. White Paper on Defence and National Security, April 2013.  
 
French Ministry of Defence. Programme Loi de Programmation Militaire, [military planning law 
2014-2019]. May 2013.    
 
The French Navy, Projet de LPM: Un moindre mal,  [MPL Project: A Lesser Evil], Mer et Marine, 
August 5, 2013. 
 
The Foreign Affairs Ministers and Ministers of Defence of France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain. 
“Paris declaration of the Wiemar Plus Group”, Paris, 15 November 2012. 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/121114_Outcome_proposal_Final.pdf . 
 
HM Treasury. Budget 2011: Return to an order of the House of Commons. London, March 2011 
 
The House of Commons. Defence Committee’s Seventh Report of Session 2009-10 “The 
Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better peace”, 
London, 18 March 2010. 
 
Thessaloniki European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 19-20 June 2003, no. 56. 
 
U.K. Cabinet Office. Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security 




U.K. Cabinet Office. A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy (NSS). 
October 2010  
 
U.K. Ministry of Defence. Better Defence Acquisition: Improving how we procure and support 




PAPERS PRESENTED AT MEETING OR CONFERENCE: 
 
Ginsberg, Roy H. “Measuring and Evaluating CSDP Impact: The Case of EU-NATO Relations” paper 
presented at the Twelfth Biennial International Conference of the European Union Studies 
Association, Boston, Massachusetts, March 3-5, 2011. 
110 
 
Kelly, Eanna. “Why the EU needs to start spending on defence R&D” paper presented at the European 
Defence Procurement Conference, September 22, 2016. Available at 
http://www.eudefenceprocurement.com/single-post/2016/10/13/Why-the-EU-needs-to-start-
spending-on-defence-RD 
Miotti, L. and  Sachwald, F. Patterns of R&D Cooperation by European Firms: Cost-Economizing vs. 
Technology-Seeking, DRAFT for discussion, AITEG Workshop Madrid, May 25-26 2001. 
Norheim-Martinsen, Per M. “Beyond Intergovernmentalism:  the Governance Approach to the 
European Security and Defence Policy.” Paper presented at the Fourth Pan-European Conference 
on EU Politics, ECPR Standing Group on the European Union, University of Latvia, Riga, 25-27 
September 2008.  
Soder, Kristen. “EU military crisis management: an assessment of member states’ contributions and 
positions”, draft for the meeting of the COST Action IS0805 on New Challenges of 
Peacekeeping and the European Union's Role in Multilateral Crisis Management. May 2010 
 
Panetta, L.  “The US Rebalance Towards the Asia-Pacific”, speech given at the 11th IISS Asia 
Security Summit on 2 June 2012, Singapore. 2012. 
 
NEWSPAPER AND MAGAZINE ARTICLES: 
Airforce Technology. “Royal Air Force starts upgraded Puma MK2 training flights.” 27 November 
2013. http://www.airforce-technology.com/news/newsroyal-air-force-starts-upgraded-puma-
mk2-training-flights  
BBC News. “Nimrod aircraft scrapped at Stockport BAE factory.” January 26, 2011. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-12292390  
Charillon, Frederic. “France and its new military budget: rethinking power.” RUSI Newsbrief, Vol. 33, 
No. 6, November 2013. Available at http://fredericcharillon.blogspot.cz/2013/12/france-and-its-
new-military-budget.html 
EDA Press Center. “Aggregated defence data 2014 and 2015 (estimated)”. European Defence Agency, 
June 07, 2016. Available at https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-
news/2016/06/07/aggregated-defence-data-2014-and-2015-(estimated)  
EUROSTAT. “Government expenditure on defence”, March 2017. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Government_expenditure_on_defence  
Fouchaux, Dorothée. “French hard power: Living on the strategic edge.” American Enterprise 
Institute, February 04, 2014. Available at: http://www.aei.org/outlook/foreign-and-defense-
policy/defense/nato/french-hard-power-living-on-the-strategic-edge  
Gautier, Louis. ‘Budget de la defense: tour d’écrou et escamotage,’[Defence Budget: Round of 
retraction], Les Echos, 1 December 2010. 
Guillermard, Véronique and Cécile Crouzel. “Budget de la Défense: la recherché preserve.” [Defence 
Budget: to preserve desired], Le Figaro, 8 January 2011.  
Hopkings, Nick. “UK to withdraw 11,000 troops from Germany by 2016.” The Guardian. 5 March 
2013. http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/mar/05/uk-withdraw-troops-germany-2016  
111 
 
Le Monde, “Qui participe à l'opération Serval au Mali?” [Who Is Participating in the Operation Serval 
in Mali?], January 21, 2013.  
Melvin, Joshua. “French arms industry enjoys boom in trade.” The Local, 30 January 2014. Available 
at: http://www.thelocal.fr/20140130/arms-france-sold-a-lot-of-weapons-in-2013  
Tanguy, Jean-Marc. “Le Livre blanc lave plus blanc que blanc” [The White Paper Washes Whiter than 
White], Le mamouth blog, April 30, 2013, http://lemamouth.blogspot.com/2013/04/le-livre-
blanc-lave-plus-blanc-que-blanc.html 
Sengupta, Kim. “Blood money: UK’s £12.3bn arms sales to repressive states.” The Independent. 17 
July 2013. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/blood-money-uks-123bn-arms-sales-
to-repressive-states-8711794.html 
Stern , Johannes. “German arms exports almost doubled in 2015” , WSWS, International Committee of 
the Fourth International, July 8, 2016. 
Urban, Mark. “UK to spend £2.5bn on F-35 fighters.” BBC, February 11,  2014. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-26124894  
Willett, Lee. “BAE Systems launches UK Royal Navy's third Astute-class SSN.”  HIS Jane’s, London, 
May 19, 2014.  http://www.janes.com/article/38179/bae-systems-launches-uk-royal-navy-s-
third-astute-class-ssn  
Withington, Thomas. “French defence industrial base: looking beyond the budget.” Indian Defence 
Review, Vol. 28.1, March 2013. Available at: 
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/french-defence-industrial-base-looking-beyond-
the-budget/  
Woron, Felicia. “For Realists, Brexit Was No Surprise”, The Gate, July 2016. Available at 
http://uchicagogate.com/2016/08/08/for-realists-brexit-was-no-surprise/ 
 
OFFICIAL WEB PAGES: 
The Bundeswehr (the unified armed forces of the Federal Republic of German), 
http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5Eyrp
HK9pPKUVP2CbEdFACboydc!/   
EU  Public Procurement portal. http://export.gov/europeanunion/defenseprocurement/ 
Eurofighter Typhoom.  http://www.eurofighter.com/  
French Ministry of Defence. http://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/portail-defense  
U.K. Ministry of Defence. https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ministry-of-defence  
Royal Air Force database.  http://www.raf.mod.uk/  
SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. http://www.sipri.org/databases/copy_of_armstransfers 
  
 
 
